The following is the lead article from the April 2001 issue of Estafeta, the newsletter of the East Timor Action Network/US.
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Eighteen months have elapsed since the Indonesian military and its militia proxies devastated East Timor. A quarter century has passed since the U.S.-supported Indonesian invasion of East Timor began an occupation which killed one-third of the population and kidnapped, raped, tortured and terrorized hundreds of thousands more. Uncountable crimes against humanity have been committed in East Timor since 1975 by Indonesian forces, with the complicity of the world’s “great powers.” It is a record which cries out for justice.
In January 2000, an Indonesian government commission named suspects, going up to the highest levels of the military, for the 1999 violence in East Timor. Four months later, Indonesia signed an agreement with the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to cooperate in supplying witnesses and transferring suspects. On April 25, 2000, the chairman of the UN Human Rights Commission lauded Indonesia’s promises to prosecute crimes against humanity committed in East Timor and to cooperate with UNTAET. Many were hopeful the rule of law would emerge in Indonesia, and that criminals would be brought to justice. Indonesian pro-democracy activists urged the international community to support judicial processes in the archipelago.
The rest of 2000 saw a steady decline in Indonesia’s willingness and/or capability to achieve justice. No prosecutions have occurred, nor have any indictments been handed down. Indonesia amended its constitution to make it almost impossible to convict military officers for past crimes or for command responsibility. Indonesia refused to cooperate with UNTAET, whose investigators have traveled to Jakarta several times. Witnesses - including military officers and notorious militia leader Eurico Guterres - refused to answer questions. Although UNTAET shares information with Indonesian prosecutors, endangering East Timorese who testified in confidence, Jakarta has not reciprocated. According to the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report on Indonesia for 2000, “The Government has not prosecuted any persons in connection with the militia-related crimes in West or East Timor dating back to 1999, although the Attorney General in September and October named 23 persons as suspects in East Timor human rights cases.” At press time, five months later, there is still no progress.
Since the Indonesian system perpetuates impunity, ETAN is calling on the United States and other nations to create an international tribunal to try those responsible for serious human rights abuses and crimes against humanity in East Timor since 1975. This was the number one priority of the East Timorese NGOs I met with in December and January, and is also ETAN’s highest goal.
Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA),
Lane Evans (D-OH) and others have introduced a concurrent resolution
Con. Res. 9 / H. Con. Res. 60) calling for the United States to
and support the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for
the purpose of prosecuting culpable Indonesian military and police
and personnel, leaders of local militias and paramilitary
and other individuals who are responsible for crimes against humanity
East Timor, including systematic murder, rape, and terrorism, the
use of force, and crimes against United Nations personnel deployed in
Timor and in the refugee camps of West Timor.” This resolution is
but it is an important tool to reinvigorate calls for a tribunal.
A delusion based on a distorted view of East Timor’s history pervades UNTAET and many foreign governments and journalists. It has three main elements: (1) forget everything which occurred before January 1999, (2) grant de facto amnesty (by amnesia, insufficient political will, or incompetence) to Indonesia and other governments who committed, directed or supported crimes against East Timor, and (3) blame an alleged East Timorese “culture of violence” for human rights violations and atrocities. UNTAET’s Serious Crimes Unit exemplifies this perspective.
I attended the first day of Serious Crimes trials, January 10 in Dili District Court. The defendant, 22-year old militia member Joao Fernandes, pled guilty to premeditated, deliberate murder of village chief Domingos Goncalves Pereira in Maliana on September 8, 1999. The killing was part of an organized attack by the Dadarus Merah Putih militia which took dozens of lives.
The trial featured inadequate translation, inexperienced defense attorneys, arrogant foreign prosecutors, and poor process. The presiding judge, from Italy, seemed to have little interest in the organized nature of the crime; the judge from Burundi said nothing. The East Timorese judge, Natercia Gusmao, urged that the defendant be charged with crimes against humanity, but her colleagues outvoted her, resulting in an indictment for simple murder. On the third court date (the second adjourned for lack of an interpreter), the prosecution requested 10 years because the defendant was cooperative. On January 25, the judges handed down 12 years. On March 1, Joao Fernandes sawed through the roof of his cell and escaped. He is probably in Indonesia, and prosecutors fear he may pass on damaging information to his militia colleagues.
The under-resourced judicial system is
fraught with problems. The SCU seems oblivious to systematic military
of the 1999 destruction, failing to develop cases or obtain Indonesian
cooperation against Indonesian military officers. As East Timor moves
nationhood, it will need to look further than Dili or Jakarta for
of a system based on the rule of law.
The TRRC will have two principal tasks. The first is to take testimony from victims of crimes committed between 1974 and 1999, and to prepare a report on these crimes. Although the report will probably not explore the chain of command (the Commission is not likely to obtain military documents or testimony from Indonesian sources), it will document the scale and horror of Indonesia’s occupation, including but not limited to the post-ballot destruction.
The more controversial Reconciliation component is limited to people not accused of serious crimes (rape, murder, systematic multiple arson) who choose to live in East Timor. If the prosecutor’s office decides they are eligible for the TRRC process, they can confess their crimes and be given a restorative sentence (such as rebuilding a house they destroyed), after which it is hoped that their community will forgive them. This restorative justice is modeled on traditional East Timorese custom, and is an attempt to compensate for the impossibility of handling tens of thousands of cases via the judicial system. This process, which UNTAET is rushing to set up during the transition rather than allowing an independent East Timor to design its own process, aims to encourage low-level militia and pro-integration people to return from West Timor, with the assumption that the Reconciliation process will dissuade villagers from inflicting vigilante justice.
But most East Timorese are amazingly
to welcome even those who committed mayhem (under Indonesian military
home. Even most militia leaders would be accepted, provided they
the vote for independence. The East Timorese know who ravaged their
- and are frustrated by ineffective attempts to hold Indonesian
officers accountable. Of the 175,000 who have returned from West Timor,
only a few dozen have been harassed or assaulted. Although militias
thousands and burned most of East Timor’s buildings in 1999, only four
returnees have been killed in retaliation, all before April 2000.
The fear which keeps many of the 100,000 refugees still in West Timor from returning is inculcated by armed militias whose propaganda, threats and violence mislead the refugees about what they would face in East Timor (see West Timor Refugee Crisis Continues). The TRRC, whatever its merits, will not end the disinformation.
UN workers, hopping from one trouble spot to another, give loyalty to the mission; their priority is their career. Many have six-month contracts, and almost all will be gone when independence comes in early 2002. They rush to complete tasks before they leave and do not think about who will do the work after they are gone.
The UN brought 180 international workers to East Timor to canvass households for a “civic registration” database. Though called “volunteers”, these foreigners are paid many times what it would cost to hire an East Timorese worker who would do a better job and still be around next year. Foreign workers don’t know the language, geography, or people, and can’t find their way around. Given the 80% unemployment rate for East Timorese, this is outrageous.
UNTAET international staff make 50 times as much as East Timorese doing the same jobs. The UN says low East Timorese wages - usually less than $10 a day - are necessary so that East Timorese workers don’t become accustomed to a lifestyle which cannot continue after the UN leaves. But prices have tripled because international staffers make $300 a day or more. A new economy has developed to soak up this excess cash - container and cruise ship hotels, car rentals, cell phones, satellite TV, restaurants, weekends in Bali - dominated by expatriate Australians who will take their profits home when the UN departs. Little of the money stays in East Timor, and no permanent or sustainable development results. For example, the UN imports millions of plastic water bottles from Indonesia - filling the streets with litter - but potable water systems haven’t been repaired. Most other infrastructure (roads, electricity, telephones, houses, commercial buildings not used by the UN) remains as devastated as in September 1999, after TNI and its militias burned 75% of the country.
UNTAET recently directed its local and international personnel not to talk with anyone outside the mission about anything relating to East Timor. This is not the first example of a culture of secrecy in the transitional authority: UN staffers have been threatened with dismissal for discussing the reasons for Dili’s electricity being off more than half the time (there are random blackouts in different neighborhoods; apparently the UN didn’t budget enough money for diesel fuel).
UNTAET is mandated to prepare East Timor for independence and should be “helping, not doing” as they train East Timorese to take over their jobs. But UN staffers are used to working in disaster areas, with ostensibly helpless victims of war and catastrophe. They do not see East Timorese people as triumphant in a long and often heroic struggle against a neighbor 200 times their size.
La’o Hamutuk, ETAN and others are pushing UNTAET to understand and avoid the most egregious aspects of international behavior, and to see how they can be a part of the solution, rather than the problem.
Eventually, East Timor will triumph over the damage wrought by UNTAET, its fourth foreign occupation in 60 years. But is this an appropriate legacy for the international community to leave its newest member?
The Hotel Olympia, moored in Dili harbor opposite UNTAET HQ until New Year’s Day 2001, housed many international UNTAET staff and was a symbol of the economic and cultural disparity between East Timorese and those who came to govern them. Photo by Charles Scheiner.
31 Jan 2000 KPP
HAM's Secret Report on Crimes Against Humanity in East Timor
"KPP HAM has been successful in collecting facts and proofs that provide strong indications that serious violations of human rights have been carried out in a planned and systematic manner and on a large and wide scale in the form of mass murder, torture and maltreatment, forced disappearance, violence towards women and children (including rape and sexual slavery), forced evacuations, scorched earth policies and destruction of property, all of which constitute crimes towards humanity. ...
KPP HAM also found strong evidence concerning getting rid of and destroying evidence, which is a criminal act. ...
The types of acts and the pattern of crimes against humanity were as follows: The involvement of the civilian and military apparatuses including the police cooperated with the pro-integration militia groups in crimes against humanity. This represented abuse of power and authority and resulted in the involvement of military institutions as well as civil agencies." Indonesian Commission of Investigation into Human Rights Violations (KPP HAM)
25 ETAN publishes text of suppressed UN report on East Timor destruction
Release & Link to full text of report up-dated May 5
"The report is now available on the internet at http://www.etan.org/news/2001a/dunn1.htm
The document, "Crimes Against Humanity in East Timor, January to October 1999: Their Nature and Causes," was written by former Australian diplomat James Dunn, an independent consultant to the Chief Prosecutor for the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor's (UNTAET). ETAN obtained the report from a source associated with the United Nations.
UNTAET officials do not plan to release the report, which was submitted to them in mid-February. It names some of the key Indonesian commanders most directly involved in planning and implementing the violence surrounding East Timor's UN-organized independence referendum in 1999. A UN spokesperson has said that the UN is not releasing the report out of concern that it will hinder negotiations with Indonesia.
"We believe it is crucial that those responsible for East Timor's destruction be held accountable," said John M. Miller, spokesperson for ETAN. "Prosecution of the Indonesian military officers responsible is necessary both for East Timor's future security and Indonesia's transition to democracy. Open discussion of the report's findings best serves all involved -- the UN, the Indonesian government and people, and the people of East Timor." " The East Timor Action Network/U.S.
22 2000 ETO: Reconstructing suitable sustainable infrastructures
Report added Dec 30
"The large influx of foreigners with different standards of comfort and greater financial capacity has meant that satisfying their needs has become a priority area: they took over the less damaged buildings and houses, and were given priority in reconstruction and supply of materials. Meanwhile, a year after the UN's arrival, the vast majority of Timorese, especially those in Dili, are still living amidst the ruins." East Timor Observatory
Dec 22 2000 OTL: Reconstruir infra-estruturas adaptadas e sustentáveis Report added Apr 4
"a chegada dum grande número de estrangeiros com necessidades de conforto e capacidades financeiras superiores levou à satisfação prioritária deste sector, ocupando edifícios e casas menos destruídas ou dando-lhe primazia na reconstrução e fornecimento de bens. Mais de um ano depois da chegada das NU, a imensa maioria dos timorenses, sobretudo em Dili, vive em ruínas." Observatório Timor Leste
30 2000 ETO: Employment & unemployment one year after int'l
Report updated Mar 29
"Unemployment - still at around 80% - continues to be a major concern, especially in East Timor's cities. The situation has become highly sensitive in Dili, where society is clearly two-tier, divided by very different ways and standards of living. ... The qualifications of job applicants, especially those of applicants to the civil service, ought to be adjusted to match the local reality, rather than have to adhere to an imported, out of touch framework. In this respect, ever since UNTAET'S arrival, English language skills have become a priority requirement for the UN administration - not for East Timor." East Timor Observatory
Nov 30 2000 OTL: Emprego e desemprego após um ano de intervenção internacional Report added Mar 29
"A taxa de desemprego continua a ser preocupante, sobretudo nas cidades, por ainda se manter nos 80%. A situação é particularmente sensível em Díli, onde coexistem duas sociedades com modos e níveis de vida muito distintos. ... As qualificações dos candidatos aos empregos, em particular para a função pública, devem ser ajuizadas em função das realidades locais e não no âmbito de um quadro importado, estranho a essas realidades. É neste sentido que, desde a chegada da UNTAET, o conhecimento da língua inglesa se apresenta como uma qualificação prioritária para a administração das N.U., mas não para Timor Leste." Observatório Timor Leste
6 2000 ETO: Transition, half way to independence Report
updated Feb 20
"Security Council (SC) Resolution 1272 of 25 October 1999 mandated UNTAET [UN Transitional Administration for East Timor] "to support capacity-building for self-government", and insisted on the "need for UNTAET to consult and cooperate closely with the East Timorese people in order to carry out its mandate effectively with a view to the development of local democratic institutions… and the transfer to these institutions of its administrative and public service functions" ETO - East Timor Observatory
Nov 6 2000 OTL: Transição, a meio caminho para a independência Report added Feb 20
"Xanana Gusmão acusou a missão das NU de ter falhado no envolvimento dos timorenses no processo transitório para a independência. “Não estamos interessados numa herança de carros e leis, nem estamos interessados numa herança de planos de desenvolvimento para um futuro concebido por outros que não os timorenses. Não estamos interessados em herdar uma racionalidade económica que coloca de lado a complexidade social e política da realidade timorense, nem desejamos herdar os pesados mecanismos de tomada de decisão e implementação de projectos nos quais o papel dos timorenses é o de dar o seu consentimento como observadores ao invés de agentes activos que deveríamos começar a ser.” (Sidney Morning Herald, 10-10-2000)." OTL - Observatório Timor Leste
BD: War Crimes & Crimes Against Humanity - A collection of recent press releases, petitions, articles and news
BD: Military and political aid to Indonesia - A collection of recent reports, articles and news
BD: Calls for International War Crimes Tribunal - A collection of recent reports, articles and news
BD: Reception, Truth and Reconciliation - A collection of recent information, reports, articles and news
BD: Refugees & Missing Persons - A collection of recent information, reports, articles and news
BD: Sexual & Other Violence as a weapon of war - A collection of recent articles and news