BACK DOOR Newsletter on East Timor .........home ...... Dec news

"As independence draws near, a variety of new and continuing challenges face East Timor. 24 years of violence have left many wounds yet to heal. Timorese fought on both sides in the war with Indonesia. Reconciliation is now of paramount importance if Timorese are to live in peace again and enjoy a stable future together. But can there be reconciliation without justice? A Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been set up. What do the two sides think about reconciliation? What do they consider to be the requirements for reconciliation: truth-seeking, public apology and redress, pardon? Reconciliation is not an easy option." East Timor Observatory
See also: BD: Truth, Reception and Reconciliation / Rekonciliasaun / Reconciliação

We should all understand that Liberation of the Fatherland is only half the objective of independence.
After independence, Liberation of the People constitutes the other half of the objective of independence.
(Xanana Gusmão, 1999)

East Timor Observatory

Ref.: JUS03-2001/12/03eng

Subject: Reconciliation



As independence draws near, a variety of new and continuing challenges face East Timor. 24 years of violence have left many wounds yet to heal.  Timorese fought on both sides in the war with Indonesia. Reconciliation is now of paramount importance if Timorese are to live in peace again and enjoy a stable future together.  But can there be reconciliation without justice?  A Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been set up. What do the two sides think about reconciliation? What do they consider to be the requirements for reconciliation: truth-seeking, public apology and redress, pardon? Reconciliation is not an easy option.


Fighting among the Timorese in 1975, instigated by Indonesia, was a pretext for the military invasion and occupation, which resulted in the death of around one third of the territory’s people.  For 23 years, the occupying forces set one sector of the population against the other, and used the same tactic again in 1999, after Indonesia had agreed at the UN that the Timorese could choose between autonomy in Indonesia and independence. The international community intervened to stop the violence but, in spite of its responsibilities, its intervention in the sphere of justice has been inadequate.  The establishment of an international tribunal recommended by the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor (ICIET) was vetoed by China. Promises by the Indonesian Government to bring the perpetrators to justice have not yielded results. East Timorese courts only have access to low-level militia who are actually in East Timor. As Patrick Burgess, Director of UNTAET’s Human Rights Unit (HRU), explained: “we’ve got the judicial process but not the perpetrators ... In Indonesia, they’ve got the perpetrators but not the process.” (NYT, 4-3-01). As long as justice is not done in Indonesia, a sector of the Indonesian military and the pro-autonomy leadership remain free to dream of vengeance.


1. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) have been set up in various countries in post conflict situations to deal with the aftermath of widespread human rights violations. “The philosophy behind the commission is that, in any conflict, there is too much criminality for any normal court system to deal with”, says Patrick Burgess, UNTAET’s HRU Director (Mark Dodd Online, Sydney Morning Herald reporter, 23-1-01). Furthermore:
“theoretically, allowing the truth to emerge lays the groundwork for national healing, which is more important than jailing people.” (Washington Post, 19-12-99). Priscilla Hayner, who researched 21 TRCs and wrote “Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity”, believes that TRCs are not a substitute for criminal proceedings: “On the contrary”, she states, “they will positively contribute to justice and prosecutions” … by the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) when it starts to function. Hayner and some NGOs believe that TRCs and courts can be complementary because they had found that, for example, the work of the UN International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague was not touching the experiences of the great majority of the victims. (Richard Goldstone, The American Prospect, 12-3-01).

2. The Timorese Reconciliation Commission

a) In its report to the UN Secretary General, in addition to the identification and prosecution of the perpetrators and redress for the victims, the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor recommended that “truth and reconciliation solutions” be considered (Report, 31-1-00).

b) In February 2000, UNTAET’s HRU organised a seminar in Dili on ‘Truth & Reconciliation’,  “on the request of Timorese Nobel Peace Prize laureate, José Ramos Horta” (The Australian, 15-2-00).

c) “The Timorese recognise that the legal process will be long and slow and that additional mechanisms, in addition to a court, may be needed for a full accounting of what happened”. However, “while political leaders argue for tolerance and reconciliation, many East Timorese are calling for punishment and retribution”, says the UNHCR. “Many in East Timor feel that the decision to set up a truth commission should wait until there is a democratically elected government, but it is important to explain to the East Timorese how truth commissions have worked in different countries.” (UNHCR, 29-3-00).

d) HRU chief Sidney Jones announced the preparation of a truth and reconciliation commission along the lines of the South African model, but said all ‘serious crimes’ would go to court (Lusa, 5-7-00). According to law 2000/11 of 6-3-00, ‘serious crimes’ are genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offences and torture. Thousands of less serious cases involving arson, destruction of private property, looting and intimidation by pro-Indonesia militiamen, many of whom were reluctant conscripts, could be soon resolved through traditional community dispute-resolution measures. A “confession” for less serious crimes could be followed by a meeting with the affected community, a public apology and then a form of community service or “active atonement” that could be the reconstruction of a house or payment for damage (Mark Dodd, Online, 23-1-01).

e) A second seminar on reconciliation organised by the HRU and the Association of Timorese Jurists came up with some guiding principles including: (1) justice is an essential component of reconciliation, and reconciliation must not facilitate or legitimise impunity, (2) reconciliation should not be limited to the 1999 events but should cover the whole Indonesian period and all parties involved, including the Timorese political parties and the international community, (3) victims have a right to information and compensation, (4) it is necessary to be realistic in view of the economic resources, and to find alternatives ways of dealing with lesser crimes (UNTAET, 21-9-00).

f) “CNRT endorse the establishment of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission in East Timor.  The right to information and truth is a basic human right.  Justice, through legal and other forms of accountability, is an essential component of reconciliation.  It will undermine human rights and set back international efforts to remove the scourge of impunity if reconciliation in East Timor were to facilitate or legitimate impunity (CNRT Congress Conclusions, 29-9-00).

g) Reconciliation specialists invited by UNTAET help to draft a “Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation” (CRTR) proposal. ‘Reception’ because its primary objective is to “facilitate the reintegration of East Timorese returnees” (UNTAET, 12 e 13-12-00).

h) On 13 December 2000, the Transitional Cabinet agreed to the establishment of a truth commission. The proposal drafted by a committee composed of Timorese and UNTAET members would be submitted to public scrutiny before being presented to the National Council (precursor to the Legislative Assembly) for approval. The draft regulation (1) gives the CRTR a truth-telling function that would provide a historical record of past human rights violations committed between 25 April 1974 and 25 October 1999, and (2) establishes a Community Reconciliation Process for dealing with less serious offences that will not be prosecuted by the justice system. (UNTAET, 28-2-01; S.V.Mello at the UNHRC, 5-4-01)

i) The National Council (NC) endorsed a draft regulation on the establishment of a CRTR, but set up a Special Committee to study the regulation and conduct public hearings on the matter (24 e 25-4-01).

j) The amended regulation was passed unanimously by the NC, which also asked the UN Transitional Administrator to set up an International Tribunal (20-6-01). Regulation (No.2001/10) was promulgated on 13 July: the CRTR would operate for a two-year period, which could be extended by up to 6 months, and would, as necessary, refer cases to the Office of the General Prosecutor. It would be composed of 5 to 7 National Commissioners and 25 to 30 Regional Commissioners.

k) An interim panel of 8, of which 6 are Timorese, started work in the interim office in Dili, coordinated by Pat Walsh of the HRU, and supported by USAID (UNTAET, 10-8-01). A Selection Panel, composed of representatives of organisations and parties, whose task is to organize the selection of the future members of the CRTR, met formally for the first time on 20 September, with 13 of its 14 members.  The seat reserved for the pro-autonomy representative remained unfilled in spite of the invitation sent to UNTAS.  The Selection Panel undertook a public information campaign in East Timor’s 13 districts, and asked communities to nominate people for the National and Regional Commissioner posts. In West Timor, local NGOs and Church groups helped to organise meetings with pro-autonomy leaders. The Panel received nominations for Commissioners from pro-autonomy groups, and reported that the idea of the Commission had been applauded in West Timor, especially as it would examine all violations committed since 1975 (UNTAET, 22-11-01). A shortlist of 15 candidates was drawn from the more than 300 people nominated by communities: Rev. Agustinho da Vasconcelos (Protestant parish priest), Jovito Araújo (priest), Aleixo Ximenes (active with the church in Baucau, former Legislative Assembley member), Alexandre Corte Real (lawyer), Cipriana Gonçalves (lawyer living in Jakarta), Aniceto Guterres Lopes, Antero Benedito da Silva, Jacinto Alves, Manuela Leong Pereira, Olandina Caeiro e Ricardo Ribeiro (associations and NGOs in East Timor), Florentino Sarmento e Miguel Ati Bau  (NGOs in West Timor), José Ramos-Horta e Pat Walsh (UNTAET). From this shortlist, Sérgio Vieira de Mello will appoint 7 National Commissioners, who will, in turn, select 25-30 District Commissioners.

l) Requests for voluntary contributions towards the Commission’s US$3.8 million budget for the next 2-3 years, covering awareness-raising initiatives, training, salaries and equipment, will be made at the Oslo Donor’s Conference in December (UNTAET, 12 e 19-10-01).

CRTR versus courts
m) While the CRTR is being prepared, UNTAET’s Justice services continue investigations into 10 serious crimes cases but, due to lack of resources, prosecutions can only go ahead in four cases. Dozens of detainees were released and took refuge in Indonesia because they were held for too long in preventive custody.  Father Brennan, of the Jesuit Refugee Service, stated that the UN had got its priorities wrong, cutting back on funding for investigators in order to finance the truth commission (Radio Australia, 1-11-00; AFP, 19-11-00). In December, the Timorese NGO Forum launched an appeal to donor countries to support UNTAET’s justice department.

n) Xanana Gusmão fears that trials could undermine negotiations for securing the return of thousands of displaced persons: “Nobody in the world told [Nelson] Mandela, ‘Your Commission of Truth and Reconciliation is unacceptable’”

o) Others are concerned that the CRTR may be regarded as an alternative to judicial process in the eyes of the international community and future Government. Amnesty International recommends that before the CRTR is set up there should be a functioning judicial system capable of pursuing cases which are referred to it, “in processes which conform to international standards for fair trial.” (AI, 27-7-01).

3. Reconciliation, objective and conditions

The reconciliation in question is reconciliation among Timorese.  Reconciliation with Indonesia is different issue requiring a different approach.

The fundamental condition for reconciliation is a will to be reconciled and to live “together” (Xanana Gusmão), rather than “side by side” (João Tavares).

Reconciliation calls for admission of past mistakes, redress, forgiveness or forgetting.

A. Living together

The dominant issue is, of course, the pro-autonomy – pro-independence divide. Living together means acceptance of the fact that independence was chosen by the majority in the 30 August 1999 vote.

On the pro-autonomy side

a) A UNTAS-CNRT meeting held in December 2000 ended with no public statement: “UNTAS doesn’t yet acknowledge the results of the referendum....If we sign (…) it means we accept the referendum results” said UNTAS leader João Bosco (Suara Timor; 4-1-01). Those who return to East Timor do so in order to carry on the struggle for integration, “to return East Timor to the lap of Mother Indonesia”, he added (RT, 3-3-01).

b) Abílio Soares, former Governor of East Timor, stated: “I reject the idea of reconciliation” (Indonesian Observer, 26-2-01), “Oecussi, Covalima and Bobonaro Districts will eventually return to Indonesian rule” (UNHCR, 3-3-01).

c) Joanico Cesário, former Sector A commander, wants to go back to East Timor but denies that pro-integration supporters have lost their enthusiasm; the election results illustrate that the struggle for integration has changed from a guerrilla struggle to become a diplomatic struggle (Suara Timor; 24-3-01).

d) Refugees have set up a new organisation in the Belu District (close to the border), the “Forum of Red and White Defenders’ (colours of the Indonesian flag). Eurico Guterres, second-in-command of all militias, heads the new organization, whose members wear military-style uniforms and promote nationalism. Agostinho Pinto, the District’s UNTAS leader, explained: “UNTAS is a political organisation whose mission is to fight for refugees’ interests, while the new organisation is a social humanitarian organisation whose mission is to maintain the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia” (NTTX, 22-5-01). Strangely, in Indonesia “General Wiranto has founded a moral movement that he says aims to help save the nation. Called ‘Red and White Youth Defenders’, ... the new group is not another paramilitary organisation, but a move to promote human rights, national unity and moral integrity” (SCMP, 30-10-01).

e) João Tavares, formerly general commander of the militias, who vowed to fight to the death to return East Timor to Indonesia, announced to the press that he wants to go back to Java and abandon refugee affairs because he is too old (NTTX, 1-11-01). This change of attitude came after Indonesian Military Commander Willem da Costa advised refugees, who were demonstrating against the aid cuts and repatriation, not to allow themselves to be provoked (PK, 27-10-01) [the demonstration had been called for by Tavares].  A month later, Xanana Gusmão met with refugees in West Timor and with João Tavares, who announced after their meeting: “Both sides no longer wish to continue enmity and we agree to live in peace side by side” (AFP, 27-11-01).

On the pro- independence side

f) Clementino Amaral, leader of Kota who has relatives in West Timor, believes that calls for reconciliation and amnesty are being made by a small number of refugees: “Those that want reconciliation are the pro-autonomy political elites and the militias. For the ordinary people, even without reconciliation, they will return if there are no pressures from us” (STL, 7-2-01).

g) The Timorese who want to stay in Indonesia should stay there: “Don’t force refugees to return to their homes if they don’t want to.  Let them make their own choices on whether they want to return to Timor Lorosae or stay in Indonesia”, said Bishop Belo (STL, 7-2-01). Xanana Gusmão said he does not care if former militiamen are regarded as heroes, as long as they no longer use the territory “to provoke instability” in East Timor (Lusa, 20-4-01).

h) In Maliana, widows whose husbands were killed by militias on 8 and 9 September 1999, when 47 men were murdered after seeking protection at the Indonesian police post, have formed a group called “Nove-Nove” (99). They are demanding that justice is done.  One women who lost her husband and two sons, says without hesitation that she’s prepared to take the law into her own hands. (SMH, 9-8-01).

i) Salvador Ferreira, a Timorese from Suai is leaving the city to go and live in Dili: “They are coming back through reconciliation, and I don’t want to see their faces”, he says.  “It is way too soon to speak about reconciliation”, says father Jovito Araújo. “It was total destruction (...) Maybe in 10 years time people will be ready” (The Atlanta Constitution, 7-10-01).

j) Two members of the Laksaur militia who went back and confessed to having taken part in various killings, including the Suai church massacre, have been arrested;  the people refuse to allow their families to return to the village (UNTAET, 26-10-01).

B. Conditions for reconciliation

On the pro- autonomy side

a) After Mnsgr. Belo had referred to conditions that should be met by returning autonomy supporters (apology, acceptance of independence and participation in the building of the new independent nation), UNTAS asked him to retract his statement: “They want reconciliation with no preconditions” (Sasando Pos, 20-3-01).

b) Câncio Lopes de Carvalho, formerly the Mahidi militia commander, said that reconciliation was important for peace, but that the process should end with a general amnesty: “There must be a guarantee that there will be no repercussions against them if they have committed any abuses” (STL, 17-4-01).

c) Pro-Jakarta leader Tito Baptista asked whether it is possible to achieve both justice and reconciliation, and gave his own view: “Justice is an adversary of reconciliation”. They were political crimes; they cannot be tried normally (Lusa, 25-5-01).

d) “We have agreed to admit our past mistakes and vow to develop East Timor” , said brothers Câncio and Nemésio Lopes de Carvalho (JP, 30-5-01), who have organized refugee returns: a first group of 800 returned in September with another brother, Francisco, formerly Abílio Osório’s secretary until they split in 1997; he was not involved in the militias and formed a pro-reconciliation group in Surabaya where he was a refugee. In October, Nemésio, second in command of the Mahidi militia, returned with another group and said he was ready to be brought before a court.  He was conditionally released “pending investigation of his level of involvement” (UNTAET, 17-10-01).

On the pro-independence side

e) In December 1999, Xanana said in Tokyo: “We wish to create an inclusive society.  All East Timorese, regardless of their political background, have a role to play in the reconstruction of the country. (...) Bus inclusiveness does not mean impunity.  The question of how justice will be administered in East Timor, and whether it will be punitive or restorative in nature, is a question vital to our future and to the confidence the people will have in their governing institutions and leaders.” (IHT, 19-12-99).

f) The different positions held by Bishop Belo and Xanana are often surfaced: “Belo has been quoted as saying that reconciliation is not possible if justice is not served”, “Xanana has said legal proceedings against suspected criminals could deter thousands of Timorese on the border from returning home”. Xanana prefers “to encourage militiamen to speak of their wrongdoings” and to do community work as a form of atonement (JP, 14-2-01).

g) “A people that forgets past violence could be led to repeat the past ... we want to break the cycle of vengeance, this is the basis for true reconciliation in East Timor”, wrote human rights organisation Yayasan HAK, a leading Timorese organisation (30-8-00).

h) “Up to 3,000 died in 1999, untold numbers of women were raped and 500,000 persons displaced ...  The survivors require more than material progress.  They need justice, and only justice will lead to reconciliation.  Justice cannot be provided simply or easily.  One thing is certain, however, and that is that the future of East Timor depends on it. … Justice for the people of East Timor requires that the perpetrators of the most serious crimes be identified and prosecuted in the same manner as a common criminal.  This means that a legal process is needed (...) ”, said Bispo Belo (SMH, 28-8-01).

i) “We must consider how to practise, how to exercise justice in East Timor, but we should not throw amnesty out of this process...I support the international tribunal, but it is not up to me, it is not my business.  I don’t oppose it but it is not my business.  I’m not a human rights activist, I’m not a judge, I’m not a prosecutor.  I’m not a politician either.  I am a citizen who is concerned about the future development of this country.  We must be realistic.  It is better to consider reconciliation, justice and amnesty, and see how it can be dealt with”, said Xanana Gusmão. He added that if he were elected President he would not press Indonesia’s new President Megawati Sukarnoputri on the prosecutions.  “The problem is that we are not Australia, we are not Japan, we are not Europe or America.  We are in very difficult conditions.  We have to consider the first years of independence without income or resources.  Maybe I can say ‘Yes, of course (prosecute), if you are able, we are not asking for it out of vengeance, it is in order to respond to the international request, but not (because of) me.” (AFP, 28-8-01).

j) “At first, I was not willing to accept the militia back at all, but I have come to accept that, if this country wants to stand on its own feet, we also have to have reconciliation”, said another Maliana women, whose father was killed in 1999 (SCMP, 29-8-01).

k) “Without the judicial process, reconciliation and amnesty would be meaningless.  We must respect the due process of the law”, said Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, (a lawyer by profession). On the question of amnesty, Alkatiri said that in a political structure it was the head of state who could grant it after consulting parliament (STL, 5-9-01). In a meeting with members of the CRTR, he “expressed his strong commitment to reconciliation”. “Underlining the importance of reconciliation with justice, the Prime Minister clearly excluded an amnesty, but says that there are many forms of pardon or reduction of sentences after trial … but they should be implemented on the basis of future decisions made by Parliament” (UNTAET, 19-10-01).

l) “If there’s no medicine, if there’s no money for kids to go to school, the anger and hatred will increase.  When the government provides basic needs, people will think, well, it’s all in the past.  They’ll consider those losses as what they had to pay for their freedom”, said Gil Guterres, journalist and founder of the first newspaper in Tetum. The priority may be development, not reconciliation (The Atlanta Constitution, 7-10-01).

m) In a recent interview with ABC, Xanana Gusmão said: “In order for there to be reconciliation between the two sides, it is necessary for one side to acknowledge that it made mistakes and for the other to have the capacity to forget, that is reconciliation … I think the important question is how we are going to achieve peace.  Of course we will not deny justice, … if we look at justice in very formal terms – trial, punishment, prison – maybe we won’t resolve the situation (...) are we able to put hundreds of people from the militias in jail and feed them? I went to every place in East Timor and what people are demanding is education for their children, health … if you see the destruction that happened in East Timor was not by their own, the militias, their own initiative, this is why I don’t see when we talk about international tribunal that it is for the East Timorese.  If it is not for East Timorese, let us solve our problem, and the community’s already told me to bring them back and we will live together, we will punish them in our own way.  We will demand to them – oh, you burnt this house, help us and build together ... we talk directly to the commanders of the militias and we have told them, please, it will not be reconciliation if there is no justice, and you must accept justice.  And they [!] have agreed to go to trial.  That is why you must remember that I put the question to all East Timorese people –reconciliation, justice, but don’t forget the need for amnesty … if it is only justice, people in jail for 10, 15, 20 years (...) Psychologically, maybe some victims will be satisfied at that moment, but after that the prisoners, the family of the prisoners we could not forgive … we would only perpetuate the environment of intolerance” (ABC, 10-10-01).

n) Xanana Gusmão spent 3 days in West Timor: “It was the riots that broke our hearts. They hurt our hearts and also yours”, he said, addressing about 1,000 refugees (AFP 27-11-01). But, after the meeting with João Tavares, he said “I also underlined that reconciliation would only work if there was a legal system.  And Tavares agreed with this idea” (JP, 28-11-01).

o)  “It is important that militia members see the CRTR as a means to further their long-term interests.  Without their participation in the reconciliation process, they will become isolated from their communities”, said Francisco da Costa Guterres, responsible for reconciliation in the CNRT (La’o Hamutuk bulletin, 26-10).

p) Gusmão’s strong position in favour of reconciliation places him “well ahead of his people”, said one diplomat. “It’s probably due to his personality, his tolerance and desire to look to the future rather than to the past”, he added (SCMP, 29-8-01).


1) The crimes perpetrated by pro-Indonesia militias against the pro-independence majority are not the only abuses to be addressed by Reconciliation. There were other abuses, and there are other issues dividing the Timorese.  Reconciliation should be a spirit that embraces all these situations.

2) Unquestionably, the main challenge is the reconciliation of the majority of Timorese with minority pro-autonomy side and repatriation of the thousands who are still displaced in Indonesia and wish to return.  Although their return is a primary objective of the reconciliation process, it should not be used as leverage to secure amnesties. To avert this danger, the Indonesian authorities should ensure conditions are in place permitting the refugees to return freely.  International pressure could accelerate this process.

3) Reconciliation is a two-sided process. Forgiveness on one side without commitment to reconciliation on the other would undermine genuine reconciliation. Evidence of commitment is to be found in the price each party is willing to pay for reconciliation.  If the injured party is willing to forgive, the wrongdoer must be prepared to make redress, the precise form of which could be decided by the reconciliation commission or by a court.

4) The Commission is not going to be a perfect panacea. It should be remembered that militia leaders are often also local traditional leaders or were representatives of Indonesia’s administration, and that these positions afforded them goods and status that they may still enjoy today. In some cases, these leaders have influence over a large sector of a community; this could be a decisive factor in proceedings and decisions relating to reconciliation and redress. If reconciliation and democracy are to prevail, the power wielded by certain people has to be removed.

5) Reserving the courts for the ‘serious cases’ seems to be right departure point for more independent justice, but the spirit of reconciliation should still be present throughout the legal process, and could be expressed by, for example, reduced sentences or pardons.

6) Reconciliation is dynamic.  The fact that Xanana and the CNRT have been advocating reconciliation from the very outset is likely to have been decisive in the return of 190,000 refugees, including thousands of former soldiers, police and militiamen, with few accompanying acts of vengeance.  The Timorese still regard the present time as a period of transition to a better future, independence, and this fact has also contributed to the relatively reprisal-free return of the refugees.  However, if employment shortages continue, and education and health provision do not improve in future, then, increasingly, people will want to find someone to blame.  Paraphrasing Bishop Belo’s words, the survivors are looking for more than material progress.  Nonetheless, material progress could well be the key to consolidating reconciliation.

Observatory for the monitoring of East Timor's transition process a programme by the 'Comissão para os Direitos do Povo Maubere'
Coordinator: Cláudia Santos 
Rua Pinheiro Chagas, 77 2ºE -  1069-069     Lisboa - Portugal
ph.: 351 1 317 28 60  -  fax: 351 1 317 28 70  -  e-mail:

Observatório Timor Leste  Updated Jan 25
Duas Organizações Não Governamentais portuguesas, a COMISSÃO PARA OS DIREITOS DO POVO MAUBERE (CDPM) e o grupo ecuménico A PAZ É POSSÍVEL EM TIMOR LESTE que, desde o início da década de oitenta, se solidarizam com a causa do Povo de Timor Leste, tomaram a decisão de criar o OBSERVATÓRIO TIMOR LESTE. A vocação do Observatório Timor Leste é, no quadro das recentes alterações do regime de Jacarta face a Timor Leste, o acompanhamento, a nível internacional, do processo negocial e, no interior do território, do inevitável período de transição que se anuncia.
correio electrónico:  URL:

East Timor Observatory  Updated Jan 25
ETO was set up by two Portuguese NGOs - the Commission for the Rights of the Maubere People (CDPM) and the ecumenical group Peace is Possible in East Timor,  which have been involved in East Timor solidarity work since the early eighties. The aim of the Observatory was to monitor East Timor's transition process, as well as the negotiating process and its repercussions at international level, and the developments in the situation inside the territory itself.
E-mail:  Homepage:

Observatoire Timor-Oriental  Updated Jan 25
Deux Organisations Non Gouvernementales portugaises, la ‘Commission pour les Droits du Peuple Maubere’ et l’association oecuménique "La Paix est Possible au Timor Oriental", qui se solidarisent avec la cause du peuple du Timor Oriental depuis le début des années 80, ont pris la décision de créer un OBSERVATOIRE TIMOR ORIENTAL. La vocation de cet observatoire est d’accompagner le processus de transition du Timor Oriental, aussi bien le processus de négociation que ses répercussions au niveau international et l’évolution de la situation à l’intérieur du territoire.
courrier électronique:  URL:

See also:

BD: Truth, Reception and Reconciliation / Rekonciliasaun / Reconciliação - A collection of recent information, reports, articles and news

BD: 'Refugees' & Missing Persons / 'Refugiados' e Desaparecido / 'Réfugiés' ou Déplacés / - A collection of recent information, reports, articles and news

BD: Pro-autonomy Movements / Pró autonomia Movimentos / Partai pendukung otonomi  - A collection of recent information, reports, articles and news

BD: Reconstruction and 'Aid & Development' / Rekonstrusaun i 'Ajuda i Dezenvolvimentu' / Reconstrução e 'Ajuda e Desenvolvimento' - A collection of recent press releases, reports, and articles

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