LAURIE BRERETON MP
SHADOW MINISTER FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
· NEWS RELEASE
· NEWS RELEASE · NEWS RELEASE ·
54/01
17 July 2001
“It is unfortunate that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and its Secretary, Dr Ashton Calvert, have seen fit to produce a highly selective and partisan account of the Howard Government’s East Timor policy”, Mr Brereton said.
“DFAT should have known better than to engage in a partisan exercise in this election year.”
“This publication was initiated at the suggestion of Foreign Minister Downer and has been produced by DFAT officers directly involved in the Government’s East Timor diplomacy. It cannot be regarded as objective or balanced.”
“It would have been more appropriate for any such publication to be produced by DFAT’s non-partisan and highly-respected Historical Documents Project. Such an approach would have involved independent scholarly review and provided a much more objective and credible analysis.”
“Today’s selective release of documents and commentary is a defence of Foreign Minister Downer’s flawed diplomacy, including his persistent dissembling on the question of Indonesian military support for anti-independence militias. Taxpayer funds should not have been spent on this political exercise.”
“It is a matter of record that Mr Downer accepted Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas’s denials that the Indonesian military were orchestrating militias in East Timor. He did so at a time when the Australian Government knew from its own Defence Intelligence reports that this was a deliberate strategy to sub-contract out violence against pro-independence supporters. Even as late as September and November 1999, Foreign Minister Downer falsely maintained that only ‘rogue elements’ were responsible for the violence in East Timor.”
“It is also a matter of record that the
Australian Government actively argued against pressing Jakarta to accept
the early deployment of peacekeepers. Speaking on behalf of the Australian
Government in February 1999, Dr Calvert told the United States Government
that: ‘One of the central themes to achieving a resolution was to
convince the Timorese that they had to sort themselves out, and to dispel
the idea that the UN was going to solve all their problems while they indulged
in vendetta and bloodletting.’ The Government could not have been
more wrong.”
A chronology of relevant public statements and extracts from leaked documents reported in the Australian media are attached for information.
EAST TIMOR CHRONOLOGY
PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
5 December 1998: Associated
Press reports announcement by Indonesia’s military commander in Dili, Colonel
Tono Suratman that the military intends to arm civilians to fight pro-independence
rebels.
Colonel Suratman says that weapons would
be issued to volunteers who would join the people’s defence force known
as the WANRA. “I will equip those volunteers with guns in order to
protect villages that are prone to rebel attacks.”
7 December 1998: East
Timor International Support Centre Press Release
ETISC highlights the Indonesian military’s
plan to arm paramilitary groups in East Timor, warning “A ‘people’s defence
force’ is just a cruel excuse to create another paramilitary group in East
Timor. This defence force will be used by ABRI to do their dirty
work, and being out of uniform they are unaccountable for the abuses they
might commit.’
6 January 1999: Australia’s
Defence Intelligence Organisation Current Intelligence Brief reports the
first killings by pro-integrationist militias.
ABRI’s decision to arm local militias
has drawn its first blood. As long as ABRI continues to contract-out
some of its security responsibilities, more clashes are likely.
ABRI has developed a defensive operational
posture that aims to reduce the profile of regular units and turn some
of the armed activity over to WANRA militia. ABRI has identified
440 villages where the population is sufficiently integrationist to permit
WANRA units to be armed. ABRI recognises that using force against
pro-referendum groups will continue to attract international criticism.
So using force against the referendum movement looks likely to continue
to be subcontracted to WANRA.
More clashes ... are likely as tension
rises between pro-referendum villages and those where WANRA units have
been formed.
5 February 1999: Downer interview
on ABC Radio
Foreign Minister Downer says the Government
cannot confirm reports that the Indonesian military are arming militias
in East Timor. Downer: “The Indonesian military are
denying this ... It’s obviously very hard for us to verify one way or another.”
22 February 1999; Meeting in Washington
between DFAT Secretary Dr Ashton
Calvert and US Assistant Secretary of
State Stanley Roth
A record of Conversation shows that Mr
Roth expressed the view that a full-scale peacekeeping operation in East
Timor would be unavoidable, and that in the absence of international action
to push for peacekeepers, the territory would descend into violence.
Roth further described the Australian Government’s determination to keep
peacekeeping at arms length as ‘defeatist’ and argued the necessity of
early and positive action to build an international coalition to persuade
UN members and the US Congress that peacekeeping simply had to be done.
Speaking on behalf of the Australian Government
Calvert scotched Roth’s initiative saying that Australia wouldn’t support
such an approach and declared:
One of the central themes to achieving
a resolution was to convince the Timorese that they had to sort themselves
out, and to dispel the idea that the UN was going to solve all their problems
while they indulged in vendetta and bloodletting.
25 February 1999: Downer Press
Conference following meetings with the Indonesian Government
Journalist: “Did you press
the Indonesians on the question of disarmament and if so what was their
response?”
Downer: “Yes, with Ali Alatas
I did. I made it clear to him that we had heard reports that the
Indonesians were providing arms, and that we were concerned about this.
It wouldn’t improve the environment. Obviously it wouldn’t.
And he explained to me that they weren’t giving arms out to pro-integrationists.
But what they were doing was what they were doing in all the provinces,
or just about all the provinces. I think he might have said all the
provinces of Indonesia, and that is that they do have some civilian people
who help in a policing function.”
4 March 1999: Defence Intelligence
Organisation Current Intelligence Brief
ABRI personnel in East Timor are condoning
the activities of pro-Indonesian militants who have threatened Australian
lives. Further violence is certain and Dili will be a focus.
ABRI in East Timor are clearly protecting and in some instances operating
with, militants who have threatened Australian lives. ... Wiranto’s
views on ABRI’s involvement with militants are not known, but no vigorous
action to reign in ABRI have been noted, implying that he is at least turning
a blind eye. ... Unless Jakarta takes firm action, ABRI elements will continue
to support intimidation and violence, or at least won’t prevent it.
7 March 1999: Downer Interview
with Laurie Oakes on the Sunday Program.
Asked about the arming of militias, Downer
said:
“If its happening at all and there is
concern that it could be happening, if its happening at all, it certainly
isn’t official Indonesian Government policy, it certainly isn’t something
that’s been condoned by General Wiranto, the head of the armed forces.
But there may be some rogue elements within the armed forces who are providing
arms of one kind or another to pro-integrationists who have been, you know,
fighting for the cause of Indonesia. ... The Indonesian Government when
we’ve raised it with them, including when I raised it with Ali Alatas the
other day, have said that it certainly wasn’t happening, that they weren’t
arming paramilitaries, there was some arming of the informal police support
group who are civilians in East Timor but that applies in all of the provinces
of Indonesia. There is nothing different or unusual about that, so
I mean, I do accept the Indonesian Government’s word for it, that it’s
not official Indonesian policy, but on the other hand it may be that some
soldiers informally are doing this.”
31 March 1999: Downer Questions
and Answers at National Press Club
Downer: Well let me say something
about this issue of the arming of paramilitaries, we obviously as I’ve
pointed out have broached this on many occasions in many different ways
with the Indonesian government and I can go back to last month when I raised
this issue with the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and he told
me that the Indonesian armed forces ABRI were not arming paramilitary’s.
Nevertheless whilst we accept that is not the official policy of ABRI or
the Indonesian government, there is a risk that some rogue elements within
ABRI may be or may have been providing arms to the so-called paramilitaries
in East Timor. ... I think it’s important to understand this, I don’t think
that it is fair to claim that it is official Indonesian Government policy
to arm paramilitary’s, I think it is however, possible that there has been
some arming of those paramilitaries by rogue elements within ABRI, of course
ABRI has a long history in East Timor.
8 April 1999: Defence Intelligence
Organisation Current Intelligence Brief
DIO’s preliminary assessment of the Liquica
massacre notes that while ABRI’s exact role is unclear,
... it is known that ABRI had fired tear
gas into the church and apparently did not intervene when the pro-independence
activists were attacked. BRIMOB [Police Mobile Brigade] were allegedly
standing behind the attacked at the church and firing into the air. ...
ABRI is culpable whether it actively took part in the violence, or simply
let it occur.
9 April 1999: Interview on
ABC Radio with John McCarthy, Australian Ambassador to Indonesia
McCarthy announces that Australian diplomats
have been granted permission to travel to East Timor to investigate the
Liquica massacre.
Journalist: What evidence
are you hearing or do you have that ABRI may be involved?
McCarthy: Ah, the evidence
that I’ve heard is more to the effect that ABRI weren’t active as they
might have been, but there certainly has been , there’s been other evidence
that they were involved, and I think we just need to wait until we get
some clarification. There are a lot of conflicting accounts of what
happened ... There have been a number of suggestions, which ABRI deny,
that ABRI have encouraged some of the militias to take the actions that
they have taken, or at least have stood back and let these things occur.
Now ABRI deny that. But clearly we need to look at it thoroughly,
and that’s what we’re trying to do.”
11 April 1999: Downer interview
with Glen Milne on Channel Seven Face to Face Program
Milne: Do you accept that
the Indonesian army was involved in this incident?
Downer: Well, look, they
were present, I understand, at the incident but there again, there’s a
debate about what part they played. They clearly didn’t themselves
kill people, but there is an argument, about whether they did try to stop
the fighting or they didn’t do enough to try to stop the fighting, and
the trouble is it’s very hard given we ourselves had no eye witnesses there,
to be able to prove the case either way. The military give one story.
Others give another story. Still others give a different story again.
So our report is that you’re getting very conflicting accounts, wildly
different accounts of what actually happened, but what you can be sure
of is that some people did die, some people were injured and it was a very
violent and unfortunate incident and we hope that such an incident doesn’t
occur again.
16 April 1999: Further Downer
comment on the Liquica massacre
Downer refuses to release the report prepared
by Australian diplomats following a visit to East Timor to investigate
the Liquica massacre. “We aren’t in a position to be able to prove
what happened there”, Downer said. A spokesman for Downer said the
report was unable to say what role ABRI played in the massacre.
27 April 1999: Downer interview
with ABC Radio immediately after the conclusion of the Bali summit
Downer: “There isn’t any
doubt that the Indonesians through this process are committed to the laying
down of arms, endeavouring to achieve disarmament using the Peace and Stability
Commission which they established on 21 April to assist with that process
but also to do so in consultation with the United Nations. I can
say that much, and obviously we’re delighted to get that commitment from
the Indonesians. ...We’ve been given firm commitments by the Indonesians
- that is President Habibie, General Wiranto and the Foreign Minister,
Ali Alatas. And their success in fulfilling those commitments, well
all I can say is it remains to be seen, but we have no reason at all to
doubt their goodwill.”
“... What the Indonesians have said to
us today is that the military’s role is increasingly going to be a role
associated with broader national security and national defence and that
the police will have a much more significant role in terms of internal
security. I think people will feel more confident with the police
playing a much more substantial role on the ground rather than the armed
forces.”
28 April 1999: Press Conference
by Prime Minister Howard on the outcome of the Bali summit
Howard: “There has been a
strong commitment made by the Indonesian government to the holding of an
open and clean ballot. ... I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of the
commitments that were made yesterday by both the President and also the
other ministers who were present. So overall I think the outcome
was very positive. ... There is no doubt that there has been a quantum
shift so far as the assertion of control both in relation to the military
by the Government and also the central control of the military in relation
to its activities in East Timor. ... I am certainly satisfied from what’s
happened publicly from the presence yesterday of General Wiranto, his participation
in the discussions and the general attitude taken by Dr Habibie that there
is a realisation that things had to change, that things have begun to change.”
1 August 1999: Downer interview
with Laurie Oakes on the Sunday Program following Downer’s visit to East
Timor
Oakes: “So what undertakings
did the [Indonesians] give you then about how they would keep the peace
in phase two? Did they give you undertakings?”
Downer: “Oh yes, they’ve
given undertakings they’ll keep the peace and ...the strategy that we’ve
been promoting and they have let me say, have been quite positive in response
to this, is that before we get to phase two there should be cantonment
of the different parties, that is of the Falantil which is the military
wing of the pro-independence group, of the militias which are the pro-integrationists
and the Indonesian army should basically remain in their barracks.
And the police would be responsible for the security of East Timor and
the Indonesians are responding, well reasonably positively to that idea.”
30 August 1999: Defence Intelligence
Organisation Current Intelligence Brief issued on the day of the ballot
TNI will continue to foster violence against
its perceived enemies. But violence will remain orchestrated and
its form and extent predictable at least for the next few weeks. ... Pro-Indonesia
militant violence occurs within strict guidelines laid down by TNI.
And the purposes and functions of violence in the territory are clear.
We have good and timely indicators of any likely change in TNI policy on
violence.
3 September 1999: Defence
Intelligence Organisation Report prior to declaration of the ballot.
TNI is still hoping for a win or, at worse,
narrow defeat for autonomy at the ballot, but privately many are more pessimistic.
A key aspect of TNI’s efforts has been activity to disrupt UNAMET. ...
GEN Wiranto has been fully aware of TNI activity, but until late August
had not acted forcefully to control it. His chain of command is intact,
with loyal officers in operational control. He was personally represented
by MAJGEN Zacky Anwar ... and MAJGEN Adam Damiri, and he regularly directed
the East Timor military commander. Wiranto did not, however, effectively
rein in TNI support to the militias, and orders supposedly issued from
Jakarta were not being fully heeded by officers in the province.
5 September 1999: Downer interview
on Channel Ten’s Meet the Press Program
Presenter: “Doesn’t the experience
of the last few days tend to suggest the chain of command is by no means
what we would like it to be, in terms of the influence that Wiranto and
Alatas can have?”
Downer: “Well, I mean, it’s
a fair question and it’s one that... on which there’s been a great deal
of speculation for the last six months. But, look, I get the impression
that President Habibie, Mr Alatas, General Wiranto are all trying to do
the right thing. And some of the commanders, clearly, are trying to do
the right thing. But there have been and there still are some fairly wild
elements within the Indonesian military.”
9 September 1999: Defence
Intelligence Organisation Current Intelligence Brief
TNI has pursued a centrally conceived
and directed strategy throughout the East Timor crisis. The strategy
has been flexible, and perhaps extended as events developed. Its
immediate aim was to retain East Timor as part of Indonesia. Its
broader and longer-term aim was to strengthen the position of TNI, and
Wiranto, in the Indonesian political system. ... TNI embarked on a finely
judged and carefully orchestrated strategy to retain East Timor as part
of Indonesia. All necessary force was to be employed, but with maximum
deniability, maintaining public adherence to Indonesian commitments under
the agreement while privately subverting the process of self-determination
in East Timor.
The TNI strategy throughout has been controlled
and managed from Jakarta, though its detail has evolved as the process
developed. ... Scope has been allowed within the overall strategy for local
initiative - and, as the momentum developed, there has been some loss of
local control and rogue incidents. ... The militia intimidation campaign
was designed to achieve [a pro-autonomy] result within internationally
acceptable levels of violence.
... TNI’s action in East Timor serves
several purposes, beyond its original intent of revenge and sending a message
to other disaffected provinces. Wiranto has consolidated TNI behind
him. He has dealt himself back into Jakarta politics. And he
has menaced all comers. An all-out military government is unlikely
in the next year. But TNI strategy of an increase in military influence
seems likely to be successful. Wiranto has destabilised Indonesia
by reintroducing violent confrontation and repression as a means of doing
business.
20 September 1999: Hansard:
Downer answer to question whether the DIO assessment of 4 March was highly
prescient.
Downer: “This particular
report was one assessment by a DIO analyst. That is of course one
assessment; there were dozens of assessments. ... You read out a reference
to General Wiranto. There has been a great debate here in Australia:
What did General Wiranto know and what didn’t he know. It has been
impossible to be conclusive about precisely who knew what, when, how and
why. Intelligence assessments are such that you can very seldom be
conclusively sure about these things, but I think the conclusion one can
draw, which we would have drawn then and is the view we have held for a
very long time, is that there are at least some elements of TNI that were
working with the militias, and that was a matter of very great concern
to us.”
5 October 1999: Downer interview
on the ABC 7.30 Report following the disclosure in the Bulletin magazine
that Foreign Minister Alatas had told Downer in February that that the
arming of civilians in East Timor was the “legitimate arming of auxiliaries”.
Downer: “...[Alatas] said
that they were not arming the militias and he said this on many occasions.
But of course he made it clear that in Indonesia they’d established, straight
after the events of May 1998, security auxiliary groups which supplement
the police and TNI, and he said that they were armed mainly with sticks
and batons. But I made this clear in the press conference I gave
two days later, on 25 February. I said in that press conference that
this is what Ali Alatas had said. Now, this was all publicly known.
The existence of these auxiliaries which exist, still exist, by the way,
throughout Indonesia in most, if not all, provinces of Indonesia - that
is widely known. People who had followed this issue would have known
that this was always the case. These are not the same people as the
militias.”
23 November 1999: Downer interview
on the ABC Radio ‘World Today’ program following the disclosure of DIO
documents on ‘AM’ that morning
Downer: “The DIO documents
have nothing in them which is in the slightest surprising. ...I mean there
is no inconsistency ... We had a large number of sources and of course
we depend on primary sources not just some analyst sitting over in the
Defence Department.”
See
also:
BD:
Military
and political aid to Indonesia - A collection of
recent reports, articles and news
[section on Australian aid to Indonesia]