East Timor Observatory

Subject: Political parties and Pro-Independence Forces

Summary:

A look at East Timor’s post-1974 history would explain Xanana Gusmão’s insistence on unity among all the pro-independence political parties under the umbrella of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), and shed light on the role that the CNRT President has played in getting these parties to work together (see Background below).

There are 8 parties behind the independence flag. Of the five parties set up in 1974, four eventually collaborated, to a greater or lesser extent, with the Indonesian occupiers. FRETILIN always maintained its opposition to the occupation. Aware of its present advantage, FRETILIN now feels restricted as part of the united front proposed by Xanana Gusmão, and wants to leave it to conquer its own territory. For some, however, talk of such a move only rekindles memories of the 1974 civil war and impels Xanana Gusmão to appeal for national unity. To counter the position of FRETILIN, which is seeking to capitalise on the gains made by the resistance, Xanana Gusmão points out that victory at the 1999 referendum was achieved because of the political unity within the CNRT, and that the CNRT would be sure of victory if it ever became a party and ran in the elections. However, for reasons to do with his own personal rejection of power, and the risk that a unanimous election result might jeopardise democracy, Xanana Gusmão does not want to transform the CNRT into a party. Three new parties, PST, PDC and PSD, will have to gain a lot of ground before they become realistic alternatives. Xanana Gusmão is appealing to all Timorese to participate in the political process, but to avoid turning political activity into a popularity contest with street demonstrations that could lead to violence.  top
 

Background:

On 25 de April 1974, the Portuguese colonialist regime is overturned, and the new regime recognises the right of peoples in Portugal’s colonies to self-determination. In East Timor, the green light to political organisations leads to the formation of 5 parties: UDT, which supports maintaining links with Portugal; FRETILIN, which advocates total and immediate independence; APODETI, which wants ET to be tied to Indonesia as an autonomous province; KOTA and the Labour Party, neither of which ever had any popular support.

In January 1975, in order to combat pressure from Indonesia aimed at bringing about the territory’s integration in the Republic, UDT and FRETILIN form a pro-independence coalition. UDT breaks out of the alliance in May, and on 11 August takes command of the airports and radio transmitters in Dili and Baucau, takes over the police force’s arms and weapons store, and demands that Portugal arrest FRETILIN’s leadership. UDT Vice-President, Francisco Lopes da Cruz, justifies the about-turn in position: "If we want to be independent we must follow Indonesia’s political line, otherwise we will be independent for a week or a month" (New York Times, 12-8-75).

FRETILIN’s leadership withdraws to Aileu and asks the Portuguese Government to disarm UDT. The Portuguese Governor condemns the coup and calls for talks but, led by Timorese officers and non-commissioned officers, most soldiers leave the Portuguese army and join FRETILIN to form the FALINTIL. After a month of fighting, during which between 1,500 e 3,000 people were killed, UDT loses control of its positions. FRETILIN manages to gain control over the territory, while the other parties flee to the Indonesian part of the island, where Jakarta uses them to justify its intervention. Portugal tries unsuccessfully to organise meetings for talks. On 28 November, faced with Indonesia’s imminent invasion, FRETILIN declares the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (RDTL), to which the parties that fled to Indonesia (which have, meantime, regrouped in the MAC – Anti-Communist Movement) respond by declaring the integration of East Timor in Indonesia. Portugal rejects both initiatives and, once again, appeals to talks. On 7 December, Indonesia bombs and occupies Dili.

Most of the population flees from the invader and takes refuges in the mountains, protected by the FALINTIL. Indonesian military operations and bombardments, the constant need to move from one hiding place to another to escape from the invaders, as well as hunger and disease force the people to come down from the mountains and surrender to the occupiers, who herd them into camps guarded by soldiers. The resistance fighters pay dearly with their own lives during this phase of the war, regarded as the war to protect the people, which ended with the killing of FRETILIN’s President and Commander of the FALINTIL, Nicolau Lobato, on 31 December 1978.

What remains of the FALINTIL reorganises and adopts guerrilla warfare tactics under Xanana Gusmão’s leadership (1981). Their activities are effective enough to cause the Indonesian military commander to propose a ceasefire and negotiations in 1983. The ceasefire only lasts for 5 months but it is enough time for communication channels between the resistance and the population to be consolidated. The talks also make a meeting possible between Xanana and the Indonesia-appointed Governor, Mário Carrascalão. According to Carrascalão, they agree at the meeting to both continue working for the Timorese people – each in their own different and separate ways. Other Timorese, while working within the Indonesian administration, are secretly collaborating with the resistance. In 1986 Xanana and Bishop Belo hold a secret meeting.

Within the FALINTIL, political reflection gradually leads to criticism of its own past military strategy and political position. In 1987 Xanana takes an important step towards national unity by declaring that the FALINTIL are no longer to be formally considered FRETILIN’s forces but rather the armed forces of the National Resistance. In 1989, Xanana leaves FRETILIN and sets up the CNRM (Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere – National Council of Maubere Resistance), a non-partisan political body.

In the occupied towns, young Timorese start organising and rebelling against the discrimination in education, where Indonesians are getting preferential treatment. In 1989, Mário Carrascalão manages to get President Suharto to authorise greater access to the territory, isolated since 1975, arguing that it would enable more exchanges between East Timor and "the rest" of Indonesia. This opening, and subsequent entry of foreign visitors breathes life into a new form of struggle against occupation – public demonstrations. Although the demonstrations are brutally put down by Indonesia’s military, they are important signals to the outside world that, far from dying out, the resistance is actually winning over considerable sectors of Timorese youth. Santa Cruz, in 1991, proves to a major milestone in this form of struggle.

Xanana’s arrest in 1992 and his imprisonment in Indonesia make possible, at international level, what the ceasefire had previously enabled: direct contact (this time on the part of the UN, US, Nelson Mandela) with Xanana Gusmão. These contacts become vital in the subsequent evolution of events that, suddenly, take a new turn when President Suharto falls from power in May 1998. One month prior to this, the 1^st Timorese Congress, attended by the main opposition forces CNRM, UDT, FRETILIN and independents – had been held in Portugal, and had given birth to the CNRT - the first democratically based resistance structure. Pro-independence forces, under the CNRT banner, run in the UN-organised "popular consultation" in August 1999, winning 78,5% of the votes.    top
 

Political parties

FRETILIN – Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, founded in 1974.

It unilaterally declared independence shortly before Indonesia’s invasion and was the main party of the resistance throughout the occupation. In 1998, FRETILIN took part in the founding of the CNRT, leaving this umbrella organization in 2000.

Leadership: Mari Alkatiri, Lu’Olo, Estanislau da Costa. FRETILIN currently holds two of the ministries in the transition Government: Finance (Mari Alkatiri) and Interior (Ana Pessoa).

UDT – Timorese Democratic Union, founded in 1974.

UDT initially advocated maintaining links with Portugal. For circumstantial and personal reasons, its leaders are now dispersed in other parties.

Principle leader: João Carrascalão, Minister of Infrastructures in the transitional government.

FRETILIN and UDT are represented on the National Council (legislative body appointed by UNTAET) by second rank militants (Cipriana Pereira e Maria Lacruna), and have refused to send representatives to the CNRT’s Permanent Council (PC) in protest over the lack of real authority of these two bodies.

PST – Timorese Socialist Party, successor to the Timorese Socialist Association.

This party has strong labour sector and trade union leanings.

Leadership: Avelino Coelho da Silva and Pedro Costa. The former is PST representative on the National Council (NC), while the latter sits on the CNRT PC.

PDC/UDC – Christian Democrat Party/Union, founded in 1999 by Catholic and Protestant leaders.

Leadership: Vicente da Silva Guterres (PC), Alexandre Magno Ximenes (NC), Arlindo Marçal.

PSD – Social Democrat Party, founded in September 2000.

Comprises leaders, especially from UDT, who seek to prevent rifts that occurred in the past.

Leadership: Mário Carrascalão, Agio Pereira (NC), Leandro Isaac, Zacarias da Costa. Represented informally on the PC because the party was only formed after the PC, by Germano Silva.

Pro-Referendum APODETI, composed of former members of APODETI (see ETO POL01 – Pro-Autonomy Movements and Parties).

Leadership: Frederico da Costa (PC), Laurentino Domingos Luis Gusmão (NC).

KOTA – Monarchist party founded in 1974.

Leadership: Augusto Pires (PC), Clementino dos Reis Amaral (NC).

Labour Party founded in 1974.

Leadership: Paulo Freitas (PC), Maria Angela Freitas (NC).

The Timorese Nationalist party (PNT) and the CDP-RDTL group also claim they uphold independence. However, their ties with highly conservative sectors of the Indonesian military position them in the opposing camp (see ETO, POL01). top
 

Forces without Political Party status

CNRT – National Council of Timorese Resistance

Founded in 1998 by members of the CNRM, UDT and FRETILIN. Membership was extended before the August 2000 Congress, to incorporate the new parties - PST, UDC, PSD – and the old pro-Indonesia parties - APODETI, KOTA and the Labour Party. After the Congress, however, FRETILIN and UDT left the CNRT.

CNRT President, Xanana Gusmão, and José Ramos Horta, now Foreign Minister in the transitional Government, deserve special mention as they refused to join any political party. As the CNRT is not a political party, it cannot run in the elections.

Youth Movements - RENETIL, ETSSC, Juventude Lorico Asswain, IMPETU, OPJLATIL, OJETIL ...

These movements all attract young Timorese, most of whom were educated in Indonesian schools, in contrast to the political parties whose leadership is largely representative of the older generation brought up and educated under the Portuguese colonial system. The first 3 movements mentioned above organized congresses during 2000. Their members might join existing parties or, because of their specific differences, could set up new political parties.

The Catholic Church

The influence of the Catholic Church cannot be ignored. Bishop Belo’s views often carry as much weight as those of Xanana Gusmão. One of the 5 Timorese ministries in the transitional Government (Social Affairs) is headed by Father Filomeno Jacob. A priest was the organizer of the CNRT Congress. The Catholic Church is represented on the NC by Father José António da Costa.    top
 

The Facts:

[gathered between 1-1-2000 and 15-2-2001].

1975 revisited in 2000 by some current leaders:

• Abílio Araújo (leader of FRETILIN in 1975, now President of the PNT): "it is always a big mistake for the coloniser to regard the colonized, choosing the ‘good’ ones while condemning the ‘bad’ ones. That is what Portugal did, placing FRETILIN in the ‘bad’ role". "Everything began with UDT’s coup" (Grande Reportagem, Portugal, Dec.2000).
• João Carrascalão (UDT leader in 1975 and presently): "the actions of 11 August were wholly correct: FRETILIN was preparing a coup d’état". "The Portuguese Government was entirely oriented towards helping FRETILIN" (idem).
• José Ramos Horta (FRETILIN leader in 1975, not currently in a party): "FRETILIN’s radicalism gradually pushed UDT into staging the 11 August coup". "FRETILIN and UDT have to find the courage and humility to take their share of the blame. Quite a big share" (idem).

• FRETILIN organised regional conferences that culminated in May 2000 in a national conference (UN-SG S/2000/838).
• From 15 to 19 May, around 2,000 party members to discuss restructuring. Xanana Gusmão, the party’s leader until 1989, directs an urgent appeal to party militants, including former commanders, to bear in mind that there can be no democracy in East Timor if past mistakes are not admitted. "I tried to open the door to an awareness that we made mistakes ... correct out mistakes and learn from them. … honour our inheritance but …honour a more open FRETILIN, more democratic in nature" (FRETILIN Conference, RDP Antena 1, quoted by the BBC, 15-5-2000).
• Mari Alkatiri, one of the 3 surviving founders of FRETILIN, admits that abuses were committed: the FALINTIL were an armed force fighting for survival against over 40.000 Indonesian soldiers. "Now the war is over, it is time to rehabilitate a lot of names and particularly put an end to the suffering of their families" (Sydney Morning Herald, 15-5). One person whose good name has been restored is FRETILIN’s first President, 63-year-old Francisco Xavier do Amaral. He had been accused of treachery when he proposed that civilian refugees hiding in the mountains should return to the towns occupied by Indonesian soldiers although, eventually, when the situation in mountains became unbearable, the leadership itself came to the same decision.

• Reformists like Xanana Gusmão are insisting that FRETILIN adopt democratic methods, including the election of its own leadership. This attitude is meeting with resistance from hardliners, including veteran David Ximenes. "David Ximenes is an important man in FRETILIN. Maybe in the future he might want to set up his own party", said Otelio Ote, ET Journalists’ Association coordinator (Sidney Morning Herald, 22-5).
• The conference is raising some questions that will only be answered at the next congress [May 2001], the most important one for the future of the party is the choice of new leadership: "A special commission will be established to organize a congress … A new central committee and national leadership will be elected at the congress", "The main concern for us is to be able to gather around all the cadres to make sure the structures are functioning, so that everyone can participate in the process of preparing for the congress", said one party militant (Green Left Weekly, 31-5).

Although regarded the second most important party, no information is available on its current activities, except for its reactions to the activity of other forces, SDP and CNRT.

PST

The Timorese Socialist Party is always mentioned whenever an event is labour-related. It organises workers’ demonstrations and their employment-related claims, negotiates between strikers and employers, and intervenes if a protest becomes too rowdy. It uses Marxism as a tool, says Avelino Coelho da Silva. "We don´t accept the argument that political parties will divide East Timor – rather the lack of democratic culture will" (IPS, Darwin, 14-4).

PSD

In August, just a few days before the CNRT Congress, news broke of a new party being formed – the Social Democrat Party (Partido Social Democrata - PSD). It is formally inaugurated after the Congress. Among its founders is Mário Carrascalão. The new party aims to attract people who are tired of the ‘revivalism’ of the old parties and there are rumours that it has received the blessing of Xanana Gusmão and the two bishops of the influential Catholic Church. José Ramos Horta denies membership of the PSD but admits involvement in its creation (Lusa, 16-8). João Carrascalão criticises the project "nothing more than a joke in bad taste", and guarantees that the UDT would neither disappear nor form a coalition with the future PSD. He referred rather to approaches to "other Timorese parties" (Lusa, 17-8).

CNRT – The August 2000 Congress

• Ramos Horta fears that the Congress might lead to the breakup of the CNRT: "The grassroots are very nervous with the notion of the CNRT ending too soon and we go back to the instability of the seventies". Former FRETILIN President, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, predicted the end of the CNRT, but "if we are going to have a democratic nation, then we must have different political parties". The different CNRT factions should go their own way "when the law on political parties is … approved, then the political parties will start their activities" said João Carrascalão, president of UDT (AP, 1-4).
• Preparations for the Congress and election of delegates were intense. Sectoral (youth, women, entrepreneurs ...) congresses were held and an electoral register drawn up - "420.000 family record files were prepared, respecting all those who refused to register as CNRT members" (CNRT, results of the national congress, prologue).
• When Xanana Gusmão spoke out against the inappropriate ambition for power on the part of some party leaders at a time when what Timor most needed was national unity, he comes under fire from FRETILIN and UDT for the way the Congress was organised. Ramos Horta’s response, "Whoever criticises Xanana Gusmão today will die like a fish, will die politically through its mouth" (Lusa, 16-8) attracted accusations about his own ambitions (Sydney Morning Herald, 29-8).
• "I have always refused to accept that what happened in East Timor was really the creation of the political parties", says Mari Alkatiri, "What happened was the result of an Indonesian strategy to annex our country". Bishop Belo believes there will be no repeat of those times: "I think they have learned from the lessons of the past. They are more moderate, and the people now know who they are" (The Australian, 26-8).
• This is the atmosphere at the start of the Congress, attended by 452 delegates, 10 from each of the 7 parties in the CNRT, plus 382 delegates representing ‘civil society’, the regions, the NGOs, women, youth ... Only 3 of the 7 parties held internal elections to choose their representatives: FRETILIN, PST and UDC (Green Left Weekly, 6-9).
• Xanana Gusmão’s address to the Congress clearly expresses his support for the parties, but he reveals his fears and calls for broad participation: "The new phase will involve establishing a multiparty democracy. … From now on, the Parties will be the principle players who will lead the Nation’s destiny. It is the task of all citizens to support the Parties and to organise themselves so they can deal more effectively with the challenges mentioned. … There must be healthy political competition among different citizens organised in Parties. Differences between Parties, between Party members, must not lead to violence. … In Democracy, the only constant element is the People".
• "Some politicians say East Timor doesn’t need a political coalition of all groups. Rather, parties can split off and go their own ways. But that position terrifies many East Timorese", Manuel Carrascalão told the Congress (Radio Australia, 28-8).
• In Xanana Gusmão’s view, up until the first election, changes in the CNRT should include giving more power to the parties but without jeopardizing national unity or giving the parties too much influence. That is why he wanted a Permanent Council (PC) of 7 members in which all parties would have equal representation. The PC was to have decision-making power within the CNRT, but the statutes would give the Presidency greater authority. FRETILIN was sure of majority support at the Congress and, therefore, of being able to get a FRETILIN representative elected as President. However, a proposal was put forward that there be a President plus 2 Vice-Presidents and that these should not be members of one party. This proposal favoured the Xanana Gusmão, José Ramos Horta and Mário Carrascalão trio. FRETILIN protested. UDT joined in the protest, and tension rose. Seeing a cornerstone of his strategy being called into question, Xanana Gusmão resigned, and then Ramos Horta. The effect was immediate - Congress begged the leaders to return. FRETILIN was put out, did not put forward its own candidates, and observed the old leadership being re-elected by 379 votes in favour, 9 against and 6 abstentions or voids.
• "Political parties will have to take over" the CNRT … "There is no role anymore for ‘resistance’; it has served its purpose" says Ramos Horta, adding that Xanana Gusmão, Mário Carrascalão and he himself are going to follow the work of the parties closely, particularly until the elections (Green Left Weekly, 23-8).
• Estanislau da Costa, FRETILIN central committee member, criticises the CNRT leadership for exploiting the emotions of Congress participants: "Our position is clear, we want CNRT to continue" (Sidney Morning Herald, 29-8)
• In Mari Alkatiri’s view, "The Congress was carefully planned to maintain the status quo, though with a facade of change"; "the only change was to strengthen the power base of three people…" (Radio Mozambique quoted by BBC, 2-9).
• Defusing the situation, Ramos Horta says, "The divisions are obvious, and that’s natural. When you have different political parties you’re supposed to have divisions. The test, the challenge is, are they going to manage these divisions, these differences in a civilized manner, in a democratic, tolerant manner? That is the question we are going to have answered in the next few months." "I think the lesson from this Congress is that the delegates from all over the country, the people are not going to allow a repetition of ‘74-75’. Any party that show signs of intolerance will be immediately voted out – they will be isolated, Ramos Horta added (Radio Australia, 28-8).
• "Everything that happened here is normal in democracies," said one Western analyst. "It is an adjustment process, but everyone has been given a chance to speak and the leaders are not dominating … not a bad start" (South China Morning Post, 31-8).

FRETILIN and UDT do not show up at the meetings of the CNRT Permanent Council. Alkatiri justifies the absence by saying: the PC "has no powers" and it is only "a facade". João Carrascalão shares this view, describing the PC as merely "decorative". Xanana Gusmão reacts with uncharacteristic severity, threatening to put forward a proposal to the PC that the two parties’ ministers in the transitional Government be removed: "they are only interested in having ministers" (Lusa, 14-9). One week later, Gusmão states that the door of the PC is still open, and that the PC was meant to provide a forum where all Timorese forces could "support and practice a policy of tolerance" and work together in "a spirit of partnership" rather than hostility (Lusa, 21-9).

• Referring to the friction between the major parties and the CNRT leadership, Sérgio Vieira de Mello says: "this could lead to the break-up of the coalition organisation and the beginning of the parties as such. I tried to convince FRETILIN’s leadership that open party political activity is not incompatible with that party’s continued membership of the pro-independence coalition" (UNTAET, 29-9).
• But FRETILIN and UDT extend their stand off to the National Council, the pre-Parliament appointed by Sérgio Vieira de Mello. The Council was to have 7 seats for the parties of the CNRT. After much hesitation, the two parties each appoint second-rank figures to take up their seats on the Council. UDT does this within the established framework, but FRETILIN refuses to take up one of the two seats reserved for the CNRT. It forces UNTAET to change the composition of the CN, and increase the number of its members from 33 to 36. Xanana, who was determined not to enter the NC, joins it to take up the new vacant seat allotted to the CNRT, and … the NC elects him as its President!
• In early December Xanana writes an "open letter to all Timorese" in which he admits that his acceptance of a seat on the NC was a mistake, as he is unable to fulfill both roles – that of CNRT PC President and NC President – at the same time. He explains that he is resigning as NC President in order to concentrate on the more essential task: "The CNRT is the only force able to mobilise the people towards unity and stability, for a climate of peace and harmony among all East Timorese... I am committed to this mission of the CNRT: to explain things clearly to the people so as to prevent consequences resulting from the power struggle" "... we all know that a political party is established to gain political power – that is their essential nature", the letter goes on, but then condemns some party activity: "Some political groups have already begun to confuse the people by starting to register the population, others compel them to sign up for [party] membership, and threaten them with retaliation by FALINTIL. Some groups recruit recently returned militia members with promises of exemption from legal action [trial] if such groups ever reach power" (open letter to all Timorese, 5-12).
• Xanana Gusmão again refers to the issue in his new year’s message: "The CNRT is regarded as an obstacle to the development of political parties. Those who fiercely attack the CNRT are forgetting something. The CNRT is paving the way so that, in the near future, the parties may run for political power. They also forget that CNRT is not a political party. We all know that if, one day, the CNRT were to turn into a political party, there would be no party capable of competing with CNRT" (Xanana Gusmão, 31-12); and on 12 February: "The rush to power ... is blinding some parties. These parties continue to pursue the policy of population control, in a supreme desire to prove that they will have the great majority of the Timorese people voting for them in the forthcoming elections" (speech at the "Reconciliation, Tolerance, Human Rights and Elections" Symposium, 12-2-01).  top

Conclusions:

• This is the first time the Timorese have had an opportunity to form parties and freely elect their own representatives. The 1974 experience, itself conditioned by the threat of annexation by Indonesia, was interrupted, and the resulting disaster is still embedded in the memory of many Timorese.
• So far, the only instances of clearly political violence have involved the RDTL group, but there have been cases of violence against minorities and regional rivalry clashes, which politics could exacerbate. Xanana Gusmão has condemned the pressure being exerted on electors, registration constraints, and the buying of support with promises of pardon for crimes, by "some" parties. The borderline between legitimate campaigning and ‘persuasive’ recruitment or provocation is sometimes narrow. Accusations must be concrete in order to correct any offences, and to prevent an entire party or all the parties coming under suspicion.
• The regrouping into political parties and dividing lines between them in East Timor the same as those of stable democracies or historically and culturally different societies. This does not invalidate the democracy, but means it must be placed in its context (without forgetting the Indonesian forces that have still not accepted the separation).
• Clandestinity (or, more correctly, the various clandestine networks) used to be a legitimate form of resistance in the context of the all-powerful invader. Today, however, these clandestine structures constitute a real threat to democracy, and they must be quickly dismantled. It is now urgent to find and apply legal means of combating their illegitimate activities while, at the same time, promoting and developing the value of transparency of activities and open dialogue.   top

See Also:

BD: National Council of Timorese Resistance / Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense (CNRT) - A collection of recent speeches, statements, news and reports

BD: FRETILIN - Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor / Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independente - A collection of recent speeches, documents, statements, news and reports

BD: Pro-autonomy Movements / Pró autonomia Movimentos - A collection of recent information, reports, articles and news

Apr 24 ACFOA: Briefing Notes on political parties and groupings  Report
"East Timor is now entering the last, crucial stage of the transition process to full independence. National elections for a Constituent Assembly to develop a Constitution for the new nation will be held on 30 August 2001. Over the months that follow, decision-making and power will be transferred from the United Nations Transitional Administration (UNTAET) to democratically elected East Timorese legislative and executive bodies. ...
Until now, the CNRT independence umbrella body has occupied centre stage.  This has had the effect of obscuring the parties who, like the FALINTIL guerillas in the run-up to the August 99 ballot, have endured a period of necessary political cantonment in the interests of national unity. The scene is now set, however, for the political parties to take their rightful place under the spotlight as key players in the democratic process. This is a healthy and positive development which excesses by some should not be permitted to undermine.
In November 1999, ACFOA published a backgrounder on CNRT called ‘From Opposition to Proposition: the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) in Transition’, to contribute to a more informed and positive reception for CNRT by the international community. It is hoped these notes will play a similar role in relation to the parties by answering the questions observers and others will have about these new players. How many parties will contest the election? Who are their leaders and how does one contact them? How have they changed from previous times? What ideas and policies do they have for East Timor’s development, foreign policy and so on?"  Pat Walsh, Australian Council for Overseas Aid

Portuguese:
Mar 5 OTL: Partidos políticos e Forças pró-independência  Report
"Oito partidos apresentam-se sob a bandeira da independência. Dos cinco partidos criados em 1974, quatro foram levados a colaborar, mais ou menos, com o ocupante indonésio. A FRETILIN sempre se opôs à ocupação. Consciente da vantagem que adquiriu, a FRETILIN sente-se limitada na frente comum proposta por Xanana Gusmão, e quer partir à conquista do poder. Mas para alguns isso faz renascer a lembrança da guerra civil de 1974 e provoca apelos angustiados de Xanana Gusmão a favor da unidade nacional."  Observatório Timor Leste

Feb 12 ETO: Political Movements and Parties: pro-autonomy  Report
"The Indonesian Government often claims that it has disarmed the militias and that it wants normal relations with independent East Timor, but its actions and statements, as outlined [below], show that these intentions are either not felt by all concerned or simply not genuine. ... Timorese society has its own traditional methods of resolving conflicts, which include material compensation paid by the offender to the victim. Employing such traditional methods might make the idea of reconciliation more understandable and, consequently, make it more meaningful for those concerned." East Timor Observatory

Portuguese:
Feb 12 OTL: Movimentos e partidos Pró autonomia: evolução desde o referendo  Report
"O Governo indonésio proclama frequentemente que desarmou as milícias e que quer manter relações normais com Timor Leste independente; os actos e declarações acima reportados mostram que este sentimento está ainda longe de ser geral ou autêntico. ... A sociedade timorense tem formas tradicionais de resolução de conflitos, que incluem compensações materiais pagas pelo ofensor ao ofendido. Recorrer a essas formas tradicionais pode dar à noção de reconciliação um sentido mais perceptível e portanto mais autêntico para as duas partes." OTL