BACK DOOR Newsletter on East Timor    home | Feb news

"The surprise decision by the Indonesian Government to propose a Memorandum of Understanding with Australia for combating international terrorism is one of the cleverest diplomatic initiatives yet made in South-East Asia. ... The MOU is Jakarta’s response to pressure from the United States to clamp down harder on militant Islamists - Jemaah Islamiah, for example - who may have links with Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network. ... Before signing up, Canberra should have reflected on the moral value of an agreement with a government whose armed forces are better known for perpetrating, rather than preventing, acts of terror." Scott Burchill, lecturer, international relations, Deakin University’s School of Australian & International Studies

See also:
BD: The Current World Crisis & East Timor
BD: War Crimes & Crimes Against Humanity
BD: Military and political aid to Indonesia

Australian Financial Review

Wednesday, February 13, 2002

Comment and Analysis
Megawati’s stunt may haunt Howard
By Scott Burchill

The surprise decision by the Indonesian Government to propose a Memorandum of Understanding with Australia for combating international terrorism is one of the cleverest diplomatic initiatives yet made in South-East Asia.

Although it was only raised at the beginning of John Howard’s trip to Indonesia last week, the less than successful nature of the Prime Minister’s visit ensured Canberra’s swift agreement. Finally, here was a substantive outcome from a fraught and occasionally troubled three days.

The MOU is Jakarta’s response to pressure from the United States to clamp down harder on militant Islamists - Jemaah Islamiah, for example - who may have links with Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network.

It has six significant effects:

It eases the pressure coming from the Bush Administration, which thinks Jakarta has been dragging its feet on shutting down local “terrorist” groups, while buying some time before Washington gets tougher.

It accelerates the rebuilding of military ties between the Indonesian military (TNI) and the Australian Defence Forces, much to the delight of senior ADF officers.

It helps weaken US congressional bans on military ties between the US and Indonesia (beyond limited training and non-lethal aid) by getting one of Washington’s closest allies to re-legitimise the TNI. The US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, and the defence establishment in the US are very keen to re-engage the TNI, even if Congress isn’t - yet.

By forcing yet another reaffirmation of Indonesia’s territorial integrity out of Canberra, Jakarta will feel it has a freer hand to clamp down even more violently on secessionists in Aceh and West Papua. Being co-opted by the MOU, it will be harder for Canberra to criticise Jakarta about human rights abuses in these provinces, not that they are in any way inclined to do so.

It may eventually force Australia to make an invidious choice between continuing support for Bush’s war against terrorism (on new fronts in South-East Asia) and repairing the political estrangement between Canberra and Jakarta that began in 1999 over East Timor. This would be the ultimate test of Canberra’s commitment to regional engagement.

Pressure for reform within the TNI and its accountability for crimes against humanity committed in East Timor from 1998-99 will ease substantially.

President Megawati Soekarnoputri is not likely to seriously crack down on indigenous Islamic terrorists. She would face opposition and a lack of co-operation from sections of the TNI, and her need for political support from Islamic parties within the People’s Consultative Assembly means she can’t be seen to be repressing Muslim groups, no matter how extreme they may be.

Much of the TNI is unconcerned about international terrorism anyway, rather they are preoccupied with fighting secessionists, resisting calls for reform, consolidating their political position and suppressing political dissent.

Because of their own complicity in appalling acts of brutality, Western governments are reluctant to talk about State terrorism, which comprises most of the politically motivated violence in the modern world. Instead they prefer to limit the definition of terrorism to private, non-State actors such as Al Qaeda or the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

The precarious nature of this distinction is dramatically revealed by last week’s MOU. Take the TNI out of the equation and terrorism on the Indonesian archipelago would almost disappear. Before signing up, Canberra should have reflected on the moral value of an agreement with a government whose armed forces are better known for perpetrating, rather than preventing, acts of terror.

To achieve so much in a document barely 1 pages long is a remarkable feat for an administration not known for its diplomatic dexterity.

Scott Burchill is a lecturer in international relations at Deakin University’s School of Australian & International Studies.


See also:

West Papua Information Kit:
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/cline/papua/core.htm

West Papua referendum petition:
http://www.petitiononline.com/westpap/petition.html

BD: The Current World Crisis & East Timor - A collection of statements on the recent terrorist attacks in the US and the subsequent 'war on terrorism'

BD: War Crimes & Crimes Against Humanity - A collection of recent press releases, petitions, articles and news

BD: Military and political aid to Indonesia / Apoiu militar, politika no diplomata ba Indonesia - A collection of recent reports, articles and news


BACK DOOR Newsletter on East Timor    home | Feb news
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