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Source of Original Article in
Spanish:
http://www.sinpermiso.info/
http://www.sinpermiso.info/textos/index.php?id=605
Source of Original Article in
English:
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article13747.htm
Posted to East Timor
list on 11 June 2006 by Tapol <tapol@gn.apc.org> : http://etan.org/resource/etlist.htm
See ETAN Menu: Current Crisis in
East Timor (2006): http://www.etan.org/et2006/may/crisis.htm
See TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign: http://www.tapol.org
Timor-Leste: Behind The Demonisation Of Mari Alkatiri
By Estêvão Cabral and Julie Wark
06/24/06 "Information Clearing House"
At a panel on the state of
the world’s media hosted by Columbia University in New York last April,
the veteran journalist Robert Fisk expressed outrage at the semantic
distortion that bedevils understanding of events that affect us all
and, worse, affect a great many people in ways that are unimaginable
(in great part thanks to media versions) for the rest. He suggested
that the New York Times, so prone to citing different “officials” might
just as well call itself “American Officials Say”. The coverage of the
recent strife in newly-independent Timor-Leste is a salient case of
this. The media, especially the Australian media (News from the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), has offered a particularly
distorted view of the crisis. Such misrepresentations are endlessly
repeated until they become “truth” in the public conscience, but they
also offer confirmation of the old adage that one way to the truth is
by comparison of the lies.
The prism through which the events in Timor-Leste are presented is that
of the “failed state”. These words are meant to ring alarm bells and
Australian Defence Minister, Brendan Nelson wasted no time in pointing
out that failed state equals terrorism: "If East Timor is allowed to be
a failed state in our region, we know that it will be a target for
trans-national crime, also for terrorism […].” The “failed state” tag
in Australia has the added advantage of hinting at the evils lying in
wait in the legitimate aspirations of the people of West Papua to
independence, a very thorny diplomatic issue with Indonesia (which,
though it is never mentioned, ranks number 32 on the 2006 Foreign
Policy Failed States Index, below Malawi and Burkina Faso and more
failed than Angola and Togo).
Evil is represented as embodied in the figure of one person.
Identifying a single scapegoat suggests that his removal will magically
make all well again. Many people today think of “Muslim” and
“terrorist” as related, if not synonymous terms. The Muslim Prime
Minister of Timor-Leste, Mari Alkatiri, appears in the press through
man-in-the-street interviews as a “terrorist” (not to mention “traitor”
and “killer”), a word that then returns press-verified and reinforced
to the street. What lies behind these depictions of Alkatiri?
The present situation in Timor-Leste is very difficult, and Australia
has not a little to do with it by putting Timor-Leste literally over
the barrel with its delaying tactics in negotiations over disputed oil
and gas rights, thereby denying desperately needed revenue to the
country in its crucial first years. Timor-Leste has the lowest per
capita GDP in the world, $400, with over 40% of the population still
subsisting below the poverty line on less than 50 US cents per day,
although the first $600 million of oil revenue have now been received
and billions more are expected in coming years. Food production is a
huge problem in this fertile, devastated land yet Australia and the
World Bank refused to rebuild the rice industry (when imports amounted
to a succulent $220 million per year). With massive unemployment, the
streets are full of traumatised and alienated youth with a great
capacity for violence, and susceptible to attempts of diehard former
militia, political factions and pro-Indonesia elements to create
instability. The average age of the population is 20 years.
Another major disaffected group is the former Falantil (Forças
Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste), who
fought for independence. As an alliance of different ethnic groups,
they prevailed in the 24 years of independence struggle largely because
of their grassroots-politics skills in the local communities in which
they moved. Yet the “non-political” police force, with its better
(Indonesian) training, was given priority by the transitional United
Nations government (UNTAET, 1999 – 2002) in creating the country’s
(European-style) security forces. Some communities were thus
over-represented and others very under-represented in terms of
loyalties and recognition in a situation where all jobs were scarce.
Herein lie the roots of the “new” development of east-west hostilities
and much responsibility for this may be laid at the door of the UN and
its advisers from King’s College London. Falintil demoralisation and
anger was clear as early as 2000. "Falantil sees itself as a force that
gained the victory but has never even had a victory parade", reported
The Australian at the time (28 June 2000).
Added to this (already Molotov) cocktail of the factors involved in the
present crisis, are the ideological and personal differences between
President Xanana Gusmao and Mari Alkatiri, which were soon represented,
inter alia, in the east-west ethnic hostilities. Then, Defence Minister
Roque Rodrigues and army chief Brig. Gen. Taur Matan Ruak sacked some
600 (mainly westerner) troops in March after demonstrations against
discrimination. They were acting on UN legal advice, which did not save
the Prime Minister from being held responsible or from being openly
criticised by President Xanana Gusmao, which inflamed matters even more.
The “wily Marxist” (The Australian, May 31) Alkatiri is held
responsible for everything, except in his own party Fretilin, which led
the country to independence. Here he has up to 200,000 relatively
politicised and mobilisable supporters, which, no doubt, is one reason
why Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer changed his tune about
ousting Alkatiri. In contrast to the wily Marxist terrorist are his
political rivals the “universally loved and admired” (ibid) President
Xanana Gusmao, the “ever-obliging” (ibid) Nobel laureate Foreign
Minister (and new Defence Minister) José Ramos-Horta and the
“popular” Australian troops who have arrived to save the country,
though they have been criticised for being notably passive about the
arson and looting in sectarian attacks. The rebel leader Major Alfredo
Reinado (loyal to Xanana Gusmao, grateful to Australian troops, lover
of Australian VB beer and enemy of Alkatiri) is described in
surprisingly neutral terms: he is merely “swaggering” and
“Australian-trained”.
“Mozambique” means “Marxist” in this story. During the occupation years
the former Portuguese colony (and let us not forget historic links)
offered scholarships for Timorese to study so that they would be
prepared to return to their country as well-prepared leaders. With an
academic background in law and economics, his work as a surveyor and
his lobbying experience at the UN and in Africa, Mari Alkatiri was,
thanks to his long years in exile in Mozambique, by far the
best-equipped Timorese to negotiate the Timor Sea Agreement with
Australia over natural gas and oil resources. His toughness and evident
negotiating skills did not endear him to the Australians, who resorted
to withdrawing from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
and unilaterally issuing licences.
Again, Alkatiri was one of the main architects of the Magna Carta of
the National Council of Timorese Resistance, a document that brought
the country’s future policies in line with international standards
(such as those set by the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea). An economic nationalist, he is concerned about environmental and
women’s issues and is against privatisation of electricity. He sees the
need to diversify the country’s economic options and believes that a
state-owned petroleum company assisted by Norway, Portugal, China,
Malaysia and Brazil will benefit Timor-Leste more than giving Australia
a monopoly on its oil and gas. Among other “unpatriotic” acts, he
proposed scrapping primary school fees, rejected World Bank loans
(Timor-Leste is debt-free), brought Cuban doctors to work in rural
areas and set up a new medical school at the national university.
Alkatiri is also condemned, as if he alone were responsible, for
Portuguese being the country’s official language. The lingua franca,
Tetum, and Portuguese have much in common after hundreds of years of
colonial contact so some linguists argue it is a logical choice, but
maintaining this Lusophone link and wisely diversifying diplomatic and
economic options may not be viewed so kindly in Australian official
circles.
The Prime Minister is also “arrogant”, which he happily accepts in an
interview with the Spanish daily El País (2 June, 2006).
“Arrogant? Even my family says so. But I am sensitive. What I don’t
have is this Javanese culture of smiling at everything and then
stabbing people in the back.” This could also be called directness.
Certainly, the man who comes across in this interview (where he is
exceptionally permitted press space to speak for himself) is
intelligent, witty and ironic, not to mention patriotic, qualities that
are absent in second-hand portrayals of him in the Australian press.
With regard to the contrasting personal styles of the President and the
Prime Minister, it is also fair to point out a certain division of
labour. Unlike the much more visible, among-the-people Xanana Gusmao,
Alkatiri in his world of facts, figures and policy doesn’t particularly
require charm and other PR skills.
On June 4, an editorial in The Australian, apropos of the possibility
of ousting Timor-Leste’s Prime Minister (because “regime change” is
what it is all about for everyone from the Australian Prime Minister
John Howard, the rebel leader Reinado, Ramos-Horta, first lady Kirsty
Sword Gusmao … who have all said so in so many words), opined, “And
while he commands a parliamentary majority, there is not a great deal,
beyond the most discreet diplomatic advice, that Australians can do to
secure the essential circuit-breaker his departure would provide.” The
Australian government is set on achieving this “circuit-breaker” (a
quaint euphemism for coup) through its peace-keeping operation. There
are very big issues at stake in the “tiny statelet”, another term
journalists like to use as if smallness can divert our attention from
them: abundant oil and natural gas resources, with China as a
prospective partner, rejection of Australian aid-tied agricultural
liberalisation policies and flying in the face of big-power politics in
general. Ramos-Horta, however, is very sympathetic to big-power
security considerations, writing (in a prophetic foretaste of what the
press is now saying about his country) of the US occupation of Iraq.
“Retreat is not a viable option for the costs would be far too high for
U.S. vital interests in the Middle East and the world as a whole. Iraq
would inevitably descend into a Somalia-like failed state […]. (Asian
Wall Street Journal, 17 October 2005). Is he equally understanding
about Australia’s “vital interests”?
The scene was set for a “circuit-breaker” a long time ago in the name
of these interests. An Australian Defence Force document dated 10 May
2001 states, “Policy guidance ... is caveated [sic] by the
consideration that Australia has limited direct control over the
development of the East Timor Defence Force […]. The first objective
... is to pursue Australia’s broad strategic interests in East Timor,
namely denial, access and influence. The strategic interest of denial
seeks to ensure that no foreign power gains an unacceptable level of
access to East Timor, and is coupled with the complementary objective
of seeking access to East Timor for Australia, in particular the ADF.
Australia’s strategic interests can also be protected and pursued more
effectively if Australia maintains some degree of influence over East
Timor’s decision-making.” Australia has begun a long occupation of
Timor-Leste and is well positioned, with very “direct control”, to
pursue its “strategic interest of denial” and, however much this looks
like a coup, the press will pursue its “strategic interest of denial”
as well.
Julie Wark is a (Spanish and Catalan)
translator with 30 years
experience in different areas of human rights, mainly in Indonesia,
East Timor and West Papua. She is co-author of INDONESIA: LAW,
PROPAGANDA AND TERROR (London: Zed Books 1983) and has published
numerous essays and articles" .
Estêvão says you can
say, "Estêvão Cabral is
long-time member of Fretilin, PhD in International Relations from the
University of Lancaster (UK) and author of numerous articles on East
Timor".
[1] Reuters, Sunday 4 June 2006:
http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=SYD331963
(last accessed 8 June, 2006).
[2] See Tim Anderson 2006, “What is Howard’s Role in the Timor-Leste
Coup?” http://www.melbourne.indymedia.org/news/2006/05/113555.php
(last
accessed 4 June 2006).
[3] See Helen Hill, “Stand up, the Real Mr Alkatiri”, The Age, 1 June
2006.
[4] Bulletin,
2006: http://bulletin.ninemsn.com.au/bulletin/site/articleIDs/D5B6AEEEB251FC27CA25717A002BA708?open&ui=dom&template=domPrint
(Last accessed 6 June 2006).
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