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"The
Dili-based Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis is
proposing an expanded and extended United Nations mission in
Timor-Leste (East Timor), beginning shortly and lasting several years.
In a detailed memorandum to UN staff and Security Council members, the
Institute (known in Tetum as La’o Hamutuk) draws on six years
experience monitoring UN activities in Timor-Leste to urge “that both
the quality as well as the duration of the international presence there
be evaluated and improved.” " Charles Scheiner, La'o Hamutuk (The East Timor
Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis)
La'o Hamutuk Asks for Improved UN Role in Timor-Leste
Press release: June 26, 2006
Contact: Charles Scheiner,
charlie@laohamutuk.org,
+1-914-831-1098 (USA) or info@laohamutuk.org,
+670-3325013 (Dili)
The Dili-based Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis is
proposing an expanded and extended United Nations mission in
Timor-Leste (East Timor), beginning shortly and lasting several years.
In a detailed memorandum to UN staff and Security Council members, the
Institute (known in Tetum as La’o Hamutuk) draws on six years
experience monitoring UN activities in Timor-Leste to urge “that both
the quality as well as the duration of the international presence there
be evaluated and improved.”
The 11-page paper, appended below, recommends that all UN activities in
Timor-Leste be in cooperation with the sovereign Timor-Leste
government. The memo was sent prior to the resignation of the Prime
Minister, but it addresses longer-term concerns:
« Foreign security forces in
Timor-Leste, including Australian military and police, must be under
coordinated UN command.
« Previous UN missions were too
short and inadequately consulted Timorese officials and civil society.
The new mission should last at least five years, learn from past UN
mistakes, and overcome UN structural and institutional constraints.
« This mission should address the
deep-seated causes of the current crisis: massive unemployment, limited
popular confidence in democratic processes and the rule of law,
traumatization, and inadequate skills and experience in state
institutions and personnel.
« Prevailing impunity for crimes
against humanity committed during the Indonesian occupation adds to the
current crisis because new perpetrators expect to evade accountability
and victims take justice into their own hands. The UN must renew
efforts to end impunity, restore effectiveness to and confidence in the
Timorese judicial system, and exemplify accountability and transparency
in its own operations in Timor-Leste.
« The role of the Timor-Leste
military (F-FDTL) was poorly thought through during the transitional
government, and ill-conceived international training and arms supplies
have exacerbated current problems. The upcoming UN investigation of
violent incidents of April 28 and May 25 should be comprehensive and
its report made public. In addition, the UN should encourage a
broad-based, national discussion to help Timor-Leste determine what
local security forces are appropriate. In the meantime, the UN and
other international supporters must train police and military forces in
human rights, the rule of law, command structures, and how to interact
with the civilian population.
« The “bubble economy” created by
UNTAET should have done more to jump-start local economic development
by hiring more Timorese staff and purchasing locally-produced supplies
and services. The next UN Mission must give attention to the
consequences of unemployment and alienation, and work with the Timorese
government to expand public-sector employment and effectively train
Timorese managers.
« The next mission should involve
more women at every level, as required by UN resolutions. Nearly all of
those directly responsible for the current crisis in Timor-Leste are
male, but women and children suffer the burden of displacement from
their homes.
« The UN’s responsibility does not
end with the 2007 elections, and its civic education programs should
involve more than training in election procedures. The next UN mission
should help expand awareness that healthy, informed political debate,
focused on issues and conducted respectfully and nonviolently, is an
essential part of democracy.
La’o Hamutuk’s memorandum concluded:
“Timor-Leste began with handicaps…. The millennium’s first new nation
was a “poster child” for successful (albeit belated) international
intervention, but it has also been a guinea pig and training ground for
experimental projects by the UN and other multilateral institutions. We
hope that the current crisis is a wake-up call for both the
international community and the Timorese leadership, and that the next
UN mission in this country will prioritize the long-term needs of the
million people who live in Timor-Leste, .. to support their efforts to
live in stability, democracy and peace.”
Background
After 24 years of illegal Indonesian military occupation, which killed
more than 100,000 Timor-Leste people, the international community
became involved in Timor-Leste. On August 30, 1999, more than 78% of
the people voted for independence in a UN-conducted referendum amidst a
campaign of terror and destruction by the Indonesian military and the
militia they directed. Following the vote, Indonesian-controlled forces
killed more than 1,000 people, destroyed 75% of the country’s
buildings, and displaced three-fourths of the population before
withdrawing from the country.
There have been four UN Missions in Timor-Leste: UNAMET (conducting the
referendum), UNTAET (1999-2002, transitional government), UNMISET
(2002-5, support), and UNOTIL (May 2005-present). With the breakdown of
civil order and threats to constitutional government during the past
few months, the UN Security Council extended UNOTIL to allow time to
design a new mission. Since Timor-Leste’s independence, major powers,
including the United States and Australia, pressed for rapid
termination of UNTAET and UNMISET, but a revised consensus is likely to
give the new mission a broader mandate and longer duration than UNMISET
or UNOTIL.
A UN Assessment team, headed by Ian Martin, is now in Timor-Leste and
is expected to report to the Security Council on August 7. La’o Hamutuk
has given its memorandum to that team to help their work. The Security
Council has until UNOTIL’s current expiration on August 20 to authorize
the new mission.
La’o Hamutuk (“Walking Together”) is an independent Timor-Leste
non-governmental organization formed in 2000 to monitor and analyze the
activities of international organizations in the country, and to
improve communications and understanding between civil society and
international institutions operating there. The institute has issued
numerous reports and radio broadcasts in Indonesian, English and Tetum
with the goal of helping the new nation achieve stability, the rule of
law, and economic and social justice. This memorandum is based on
dozens of La’o Hamutuk investigations, referenced in the memorandum and
available at http://www.laohamutuk.org
Fully referenced text and pdf version, also available at http://www.laohamutuk.org/reports/UN/06LHSuggestUN.html
Suggestions for the Next United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste
by Charles Scheiner
Timor-Leste Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis[*]
22 June 2006
The Timor-Leste Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis
(La’o Hamutuk) has, together with others in Timor-Leste civil society,
closely monitored and reported on activities of international
institutions in Timor-Leste, including the United Nations, for the past
six years. During this time, we have identified numerous problems with
the mandates and operation of UNTAET, UNMISET and UNOTIL and have made
many recommendations. We are informed and independent analysts, both
Timorese and non-Timorese, based in Timor-Leste but without financial
or official links to the UN or other international institutions. We
believe this enables us to monitor independently and to have a broader
view than many people within the UN system or development industry. As
such, we have identified lessons not often noted by those constrained
by organizational or cultural limitations.
This memorandum does not provide a comprehensive analysis or set of
recommendations for how future international involvement in Timor-Leste
should be designed. Rather, it discusses several vital or controversial
issues that must be taken into account to improve the next UN Mission
and ensure that it best serves the needs of the people of Timor-Leste.
We hope that it is a helpful contribution to the debate, and look
forward to ongoing dialogue and discussion.
Sovereignty and respect
Many diplomats over the last few weeks have referred to Timor-Leste as
a “child” of the international community or the United Nations.
Although we agree that the international community should continue to
assist Timor-Leste’s development as a sovereign member of the community
of nations, we caution against the intrinsic paternalism of the
parent-child analogy and relationship. As in human parenting, support
for nation-building should heed Kahlil Gibran’s advice to respect
“their own thoughts” and “seek not to make them like you.”[1]
In addition to recognizing the sovereignty of Timor-Leste’s government,
the international community should heed the needs and desires of its
people.
We are particularly troubled by Australia’s desire for exceptional
status in the international community’s involvement in Timor-Leste.
Australia’s government repeatedly demonstrated its lack of respect for
Timor-Leste’s sovereign rights and the rule of law during negotiations
over Timor Sea oil and gas reserves. More recently, Australia sent
inappropriately trained soldiers and has only reluctantly coordinated
its security personnel with other international contributors,
preferring that they be under Australia’s direct command. The
Australian government has suggested that an Australian officer take
control of Timor-Leste’s national police for the foreseeable future.
The United Nations must not endorse or accept involvement by Australia
or any other nation except as a full partner in a multilateral United
Nations force, under UN command.
During the past two weeks, we have received many reports of arrogant or
racist actions by Australian military personnel in Timor-Leste. They
have detained a prominent Timorese journalist, repeatedly slandered
Timor-Leste’s elected leaders, and abused alleged “Lorosa’e” people. In
addition to failing to stop house burnings and other violence,
Australian soldiers have aggressively broken into homes and terrorized
their occupants, including Cuban doctors. Many in Australia’s
mainstream media vindictively attack Timor-Leste’s Prime Minister, and
decisions from Canberra reflect the bias which this creates among
Australian citizens, soldiers and political leaders. If Timor-Leste is
anyone’s “child,” it needs protection from this abusive would-be foster
father who lives next door. There can be no excuse for allowing
Australian soldiers or police to have a different command structure
than other UN and international military, police and civilian personnel
in Timor-Leste.
For the last four years, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste has
been an independent, sovereign member of the community of nations.
Consequently, any action by the United Nations or the international
community in Timor-Leste must be undertaken with the cooperation of the
legitimate government of that nation. Under Timor-Leste’s Constitution,
government officials and institutions continue to carry out their legal
roles and responsibilities. The UN and other international agencies
present in Timor-Leste must respect the decisions of that government,
and coordinate with it at the national and District levels, as well as
with other Timorese institutions. The legitimacy of the RDTL government
does not evaporate because of rumors, allegations, vituperative
slander, or paramilitary opposition.
However, if in the future Timor-Leste’s government should lose its
capacity to function or if the RDTL Constitution should be rendered
ineffective by illegal or violent means, the United Nations must not
become paralyzed. Rather, it should act in the interests of the people
of Timor-Leste, providing humanitarian assistance, protecting human
rights, and assisting in the restoration of peaceful, democratic rule.
Timor-Leste is far from this point and we hope will never descend to
it, but the UN should ensure that neither Australia nor any other
domestic or foreign actor is allowed to subvert Timor-Leste’s
sovereignty and constitutional democracy.
Staying the course
Currently, there is widespread consensus that the United Nations
withdrew from Timor-Leste prematurely. Many now understand that
nation-building is difficult and takes time, and cannot be rushed or
aborted to meet financial or political desires of Security Council
member states.
As the UN prepares to re-engage in Timor-Leste, it is crucial that the
quality as well as the duration of the international presence there be
evaluated and improved. If UNTAET[2] and UNMISET[3] had lasted twice as many years, but used the same
methods, personnel, projects and priorities, Timor-Leste might well
have evolved into a crisis similar to the present one.
Over the last six years, the UN and other international institutions
have learned much about nation-building. Timor-Leste, as the first
sovereign transitional government undertaken by the United Nations,
experienced many trial-and-error experiments. The people of Timor-Leste
endured the consequences of a learning process which may benefit
citizens of other emerging nations. Both the Timorese and the
international community can gain some small satisfaction that there
will now be a second chance. We hope that lessons learned since 1999
will be applied in Timor-Leste this time – but even more we urge the
United Nations and other international participants in this process to
think outside the box and to make every effort not to repeat mistakes
which stem from structural or political limitations of United Nations
Missions.[4] This time, let’s get it right!
In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on Women,
Peace and Security [ http://www.peacewomen.org/
]. This recognizes the unique consequences of armed conflict on women,
and the benefits of increased participation by women in peacekeeping,
other UN operations and decision-making. As the UN designs its next
mission in Timor-Leste, a gender perspective is essential, with more
women involved at every level than there were in UNTAET, UNMISET and
UNOTIL. Although nearly all of those directly responsible for the
current crisis in Timor-Leste are male, women and children are
suffering the main burden of displacement from their homes.
The next UN mission is being designed in an emergency atmosphere.
Although immediate humanitarian and security concerns must be dealt
with, there are deeper-seated causes of the current problems, and
crises will recur if they are not addressed. We hope that the UN will
find ways to attend to these – economic development, broad civic
education, trauma recovery, transparency, capacity-building and justice
– in comprehensive and effective ways. As in UNTAET, security and
emergency relief can be dealt with relatively quickly, but these more
difficult issues should be the main foci of UN activities in
Timor-Leste for the next several years.
The resurrected UN mission should be planned to last five years or
more. Although international facilitation and support for the 2007
elections is important, the responsibility of the international
community must not end with democratic, free and fair elections and the
installation of the elected government. These are steps in the journey
toward stability and constitutional democracy, not the final
destination.
Over the past six years, UN Missions in Timor-Leste have been
authorized one year or less at a time, with much frenetic attention
given at the end of each period to the mission’s renewal or
transformation to its next incarnation. This process wastes valuable
political and human energy and removes many of the best international
personnel from Timor-Leste. As contracts near their end, UN staff and
Volunteers begin looking for their next postings; the most capable and
experienced people will find new jobs. The current month-by-month
extension is the most vivid example of this problem that has plagued
Timor-Leste since 2001. We strongly encourage the Security Council to
give the new mission a mandate of at least two years, with a
presumption of renewal rather than of termination when the time is up.
The recent extension of MINUSTAH in Haiti[5] contains
the phrase “with the intention to renew for further periods,” and a
similar intention could be expressed for Timor-Leste if the Security
Council is unwilling to authorize a mission longer than two years at
this time.
Justice
It is widely recognized that the government of Indonesia, the
international community, and the government of Timor-Leste have failed
to secure justice for crimes against humanity and other serious crimes
committed during the 24-year illegal occupation of Timor-Leste by
Indonesia, or even the small percentage of those crimes committed
during the UN presence in 1999. This memo will not describe the
prevailing impunity or the deep frustration felt by victims of these
crimes over the lack of accountability. This has been well documented
by many qualified observers, including in the reports of the UN
Commission of Experts [ http://www.etan.org/etanpdf/pdf3/N0542617.pdf
] [6] and Timor-Leste’s Commission for Truth,
Reception and Reconciliation (CAVR) [ http://www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm
].[7] The CAVR’s Final Report describes the legacy of
the lack of justice for years of human rights violations: “Impunity has
become entrenched” and “Respect for the rule of law and the organs of
the state responsible for its administration, a fundamental pillar of …
nation building in Timor-Leste, will always be extremely fragile in
this context.”
We concur and add that the repeated advocacy of “reconciliation” and
“amnesty” by President Xanana Gusmão and other Timor-Leste
leaders exacerbates this situation. However, most Timor-Leste leaders
remember 24 years of serious crimes committed against their people,
when the international community turned a deaf ear to their cries for
help. We should not be surprised that Timor-Leste feels unable to
single-handedly take up the burden for prosecuting crimes against
humanity committed by Indonesian nationals acting on behalf of the
Indonesian government. The international community has an unfinished
obligation, and the primary responsibility should rest with the United
Nations and not be left to RDTL’s government. These were, after all,
crimes against humanity.
Over the last few months, two consequences of the failure to provide
justice have become manifest: perpetrators anticipate impunity for
serious crimes, and victims, lacking confidence that the justice system
will do its job, take matters into their own hands. The frequent
inability of Timor-Leste’s court system to deal with recent crimes is
an obstacle, but the abandonment of justice responsibilities by UNTAET
and its successors is the larger problem, and both should be addressed
by the next UN Mission. Reconstructing the police force will deal with
only part of Timor-Leste’s security deficit. Until there is widespread
confidence in the judicial system and the rule of law, Timor-Leste’s
peaceful and constitutional government will remain in danger, as some
will resort to illegal or extra-constitutional processes to gain
property or power.
In addition to securing justice and establishing the rule of law for
past and current crimes, the United Nations itself should set a better
example. Status of Mission Agreements for UNTAET and UNMISET, which
secretly granted UN personnel and contractors immunity from Timor-Leste
laws, should not be perpetuated. The UN must commit itself to follow
Timor-Leste’s laws and to break the pattern exemplified by the
UNTAET-approved illegal tax exemption given to the Amos W floating hotel[8] and the lack of public accountability and
transparency for violent demonstrations and police killings in Dili on
4 December 2002.[9] Timor-Leste’s government has also
failed to publish its findings about this incident, but the United
Nations should fulfill its responsibility to transparency, because UN
police were largely responsible for PNTL at that time. One legacy of
the lack of information and accountability for 4 December is that
people have little faith in the commissions formed by the RDTL
government to investigate charges of discrimination within F-FDTL and
the events of 29 April. The new international commission researching
the April and May violent incidents must set a better precedent.
Security forces
The design and creation of the Falintil-FDTL military force during
UNTAET were heavily influenced by the Kings College study and other
international advice. Among the major considerations were providing
dignified employment to FALINTIL veterans and deterring militia
incursions from West Timor. In 1999, this latter concern had caused the
CNRT to abandon its view that Timor-Leste did not need a military
force, opting instead for an army and future navy to provide external
security. However, the border with West Timor was to remain under
police jurisdiction, provided that Indonesia also demilitarized the
border.
Since Indonesia has officially accepted Timor-Leste’s sovereignty and
most of the Indonesian military is increasingly under government
control, Timor-Leste’s reconciliation efforts with Jakarta have
substantially reduced the security threat from the north or west. Any
threat from Timor-Leste’s other neighbor, Australia, will be dealt with
by diplomacy rather than military combat. Hence the F-FDTL, with no
clear purpose and no apparent enemies, is left looking for something to
do, resenting the clearer mission and greater resources of the police,
creating intelligence units to find enemies, and occasionally taking on
unauthorized or unconstitutional internal security functions.
Short-term decisions made by UNTAET, CNRT, and the Constituent Assembly
may have contributed to a long-term nightmare.[10]
Many F-FDTL soldiers, including all of its higher-level officers,
developed their military experience as part of the underground guerilla
resistance during the Indonesian occupation. As such, they are used to
taking initiative in a highly-decentralized structure, operating
secretly and independently, distributing weapons clandestinely from
black-market sources. Distinctions between soldiers and civilians were
blurred, as individuals alternated between the armed resistance and the
civilian underground, often assuming multiple roles. Although these
tactics and skills are essential for a guerilla resistance, they are
anathema to a defense force commanded by an elected civilian
government. As new recruits without guerilla experience are added to
the force, the intrinsic contradictions become increasingly unstable.
During the last few years, F-FDTL has received training and weapons
from a variety of international sources, but this support did not
adequately address the historical and internal inconsistencies with
F-FDTL’s stated mission. Furthermore, since F-FDTL has no
constitutional role in internal security,[11]
training did not prepare them to interact with the civilian population,
respect human rights, use firearms appropriately, coordinate with PNTL
or perform policing tasks. The disastrous results became apparent on 28
April and 25 May 2006, although many informed observers and Timorese
citizens were aware of them long before. It’s a sad irony that Falintil
virtually never killed Indonesian noncombatants during 24 years of
resistance to military occupation, but after four years of independence
and international training they have turned their guns on their
compatriots.
In addition to publishing a thorough report on these incidents, the
RDTL government, together with the next UN Mission and other
international advisors, should give careful thought to the role of
military forces in Timor-Leste’s future. This should be planned for the
long-term, focused on the needs of the nation rather than historical
inertia, rivalries or role models. There are better ways to honor the
heroes of Timor-Leste’s liberation than preparing them to fight a war
they have already won and which will never happen again.
Some have proposed that Timor-Leste’s military include a battalion to
serve on UN peacekeeping missions in other countries. We do not believe
that this makes sense at this time, as most developing countries which
lend their armies to the UN do it to bring revenues into their
government budget. Since Timor-Leste is blessed with petroleum
reserves, it does not need money from exporting its military forces.[12] Rather, their human capital is needed in
Timor-Leste, and their skills and commitment to the nation should be
utilized in ways which assist the development of Timor-Leste’s economy,
infrastructure and long-term future, honor the veterans, and provide
them with employment and income.
Other suggested future roles for the F-FDTL include functions usually
done by civilians, such as public works and natural disaster relief.
The continuation of Timor-Leste’s military force, and the revision of
its responsibilities, are serious decisions which require deep
discussion and consultation at all levels of society over an extended
period of time. Since most of the proposed future roles do not involve
combat, training during the discussion period can impart essential
knowledge to both military and police forces in human rights, the rule
of law, command structures as well as legal and illegal orders, and how
to interact with the general population.
Lao Hamutuk has reported[13] about problems with
international police training and the difficult transfer of authority
from the UN police (UNPOL) to the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL),
which was spotlighted on 4 December 2002. Although some of the most
egregious shortcomings have since been addressed, problems remain at
both the operational and command levels. We are also concerned about
paramilitary units of the police, and inappropriate, large weapons
issued to PNTL which have leaked into the population. As with F-FDTL,
clandestine habits have no place in a democracy’s security forces.
The current crisis, including the virtual disappearance of PNTL from
Dili in recent weeks, illustrates the need for better training about
its public service role and the need for credible, independent,
civilian oversight of police operations. The police should not be
turned into a political instrument at the beck and call of particular
politicians. But this does not mean it should be under a foreign
commander, as Australia has suggested. Rather, it should be run as part
of the civil service, with a professional, neutral commander acceptable
to all components of Timor-Leste society. The Interior Ministry should
be kept free of politics, perhaps with an independent oversight board
similar to the advisory councils for the Petroleum Fund and other
sensitive government functions.
Economic development and capacity-building
Traditionally, sustainable economic development has not been considered
part of UN missions, but there is an unbreakable link between economic
development and security. As Dili has graphically illustrated over the
past month, a society with a significant proportion of unemployed,
alienated young men can easily spin out of control if the institutions
responsible for law and order are disrupted. Sporadic riots of such
people occur occasionally even in long-established, prosperous
democracies.
Much has been written about the temporary “bubble economy” created by
the fraction of UNTAET and UNMISET money that entered the Timor-Leste
economy and provided employment and supported secondary businesses. In
fact, less than 1% of the money spent on these missions paid salaries
of Timor-Leste workers,[14] and the bulk of the money
received by international staff never came to Timor-Leste. Furthermore,
these administrations were among the most militarized in history, with
most of their personnel and the majority of their dollars allocated to
armed forces.
As the UN increases its operations in Timor-Leste, it should use UN
activities to stimulate Timor-Leste’s nascent local economy. In the
past, the UN imported many supplies and services (food, water,
printing, etc.) from overseas, foregoing the opportunity to use money
designated for Timor-Leste within the country. Priority was given to
water, electricity and communications systems to support UN operations,
rather than the nation as a whole. If more thought had been given to
this, with a longer-term rather than a crisis response orientation,
Timor-Leste’s economic development would be stronger now, as more
businesses and public services jump-started with UN expenditures would
have survived the drawdown, continuing to provide jobs.
Another area where the UN and aid agencies can help is by promoting
public employment. For ideological reasons, the World Bank and other
agencies have pushed Timor-Leste to minimize the number of
public-sector jobs. But since unemployment creates instability, and
since Timor-Leste’s petroleum revenues would allow it to employ
significantly more government workers, there is no logical reason not
to hire the people required to perform necessary functions, such as
road construction and repair, school construction, health care
delivery, and rural electrification. When countries like the United
States experienced unemployment levels in the 1930s similar to
Timor-Leste’s today, they created the Works Progress Administration and
the Civilian Conservation Corps. The UN Mission could hire large
numbers of unemployed people on temporary contracts, putting their
skills to productive use, improving their sense of participation in the
society, imparting work skills and experience, and leading to some
longer-term jobs.
Timor-Leste’s government has had difficulties administering programs
and projects, partly because of inadequacies in capacity building,[15] over-zealous anti-corruption procedures and
excessive centralization. The UN could assist with expanded public
works programs by providing training and advice and by helping to
design improved, decentralized procedures.
All such activities must be undertaken in close coordination with the
Timor-Leste government, and the international civil servants and
consultants who implement them should have appropriate teaching and
mentoring skills. They must be accountable to Timor-Leste’s needs,
rather than to UN organizational structures and distant supervisors. To
accomplish this, the UN needs to conduct an long-overdue review of how
it recruits, evaluates and promotes staff and volunteers.
It took UNTAET two years to realize that Transitional, not
Administration, was the most important word in their name. Now that
this is understood, international advisors should be selected for their
ability to train and support local staff to do line functions, not to
carry them out in isolation. Attention must also be given to trainers’
language skills – not only politically selected Portuguese but also
practically useful Tetum and Malay languages are important in training
people whose formal education has been in Indonesian.
Previous UN Missions have a structural weakness which is particularly
damaging to efforts to strengthen state institutions and their
personnel: short-term contracts and delays in recruiting qualified
international advisors. In a stable government, it can take a decade or
more for someone to gain the skills and experience to manage a
department or project, and they learn from their superiors and
co-workers throughout this period. But in advisor-heavy Timor-Leste,
mentors and advisors come and go several times a year, without enough
time to fully understand the institutions or the people they are
working with. Significant time is lost to recruitment delays, and
advisors nearing the end of their short contracts spend their last
months looking for their next assignment. There has to be a better way,
and authorizing the mission for a longer period (see above) is a
prerequisite.
Civic Education and Democracy
One of the root causes of the current crisis is that neither the
public, government officials, nor politically active citizens have
confidence in constitutional methods for resolving disputes. This is
not surprising, as the great majority of Timor-Leste citizens have
never lived in a functioning democracy where issues are debated and
decided legally and peacefully. Broad-based civic education is
necessary not only to teach the mechanisms of electoral processes , but
to persuade the population that such processes can be effective and
serve the long-term interests of the entire society, regardless of who
wins in the short term.
The ineffectiveness of internationally-provided civic education and
political party development in Timor-Leste can be seen from the
results. Political debates are conducted ad hominem, rather than on
substantive issues. Politicians attack their adversaries’ integrity,
rather than suggesting alternative policies. Dissatisfied voters insult
or give up on their elected representatives, rather than persuading
them to change their views. Political leaders are beholden to their
party or patron, rather than the electorate. Media coverage amplifies
personal charges and counter-charges, without analysis or facts to help
the reader or viewer decide what is true. And when tensions escalate,
most people – journalists, police and other civil servants, political
leaders – abandon their public responsibilities to respond to personal
and family needs. These are fundamental problems, which cannot be fixed
by training in election law. But they must be addressed if Timor-Leste
is to endure as a stable nation, where human rights are respected and
disputes are resolved peacefully, legally and democratically.
As the UN works to re-establish the rule of law, it must also give
attention to developing a consciousness in both leaders and the general
public that healthy political debate, focused on issues and conducted
respectfully and nonviolently, is an essential part of democracy.
Reconciliation between formerly polarized individuals and institutions
is essential, but it must incorporate compromise and common interests,
not only apology, compensation and forgiveness. And it cannot
substitute for justice.
One of the contributing factors to the current crisis is the propensity
of many Timorese to panic easily, a result of decades of military
atrocities leaving nearly the entire population with post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD).[16] The UN should address
this problem among the larger population, both as a public health
matter and as a prerequisite for confidence in democratic processes.
Communications media – telephone, newspapers, internet, radio and
television – must be improved, made more accessible and utilized for
rumor control and to disseminate complete and accurate information.
When people do not trust information from public sources, they rely on
rumor, imagination and disinformation, heightening tensions and
displacement.
Conclusion
Nation-building is always difficult, and Timor-Leste began with
handicaps resulting from international criminality and deliberate
ignorance prior to 1999. The millennium’s first new nation was a
“poster child” for successful (albeit belated) international
intervention, but it has also been a guinea pig and training ground for
experimental projects by the UN and other multilateral institutions. We
hope that the current crisis is a wake-up call for both the
international community and the Timorese leadership, and that the next
UN mission in this country will prioritize the long-term needs of the
million people who live in Timor-Leste, overcoming institutional
practices and customary constraints to support their efforts to live in
stability, democracy and peace. This would not only support state
institutions in Timor-Leste, but could provide essential experience in
successful institution-building and capacity development for the United
Nations, as the international community enters a new era of
peacebuilding.
Notes
[*] The Timor-Leste Institute for Reconstruction
Monitoring and Analysis, also known as La’o Hamutuk (Walking Together)
is an East Timorese non-governmental organization which, since 2000,
has monitored the activities and programs of international institutions
active in Timor-Leste. Many of its reports and publications can be
found in English and Bahasa Indonesia at http://www.laohamutuk.org. Among
other things, these reports discuss United Nations Missions in
Timor-Leste, bi- and multi-lateral assistance, international financial
institutions and Timor-Leste’s petroleum development. The Dili office
contact information is at the top of this page; in addition, La’o
Hamutuk researcher Charles Scheiner is currently reachable at P.O. Box
1182, White Plains, NY 10602 USA; +1-914-831-1098, +1-914-473-3185
(cell) or charlie@laohamutuk.org.
[1] “Your children are not your children. /
They are the sons and daughters of Life's longing for itself. / They
come through you but not from you, / And though they are with you, yet
they belong not to you. / You may give them your love but not your
thoughts. / For they have their own thoughts. / … / You may strive to
be like them, but seek not to make them like you.” (excerpt from The
Prophet by Kahlil Gibran, 1923).
[2] In May 2002, La’o Hamutuk published
East Timor Faces Post-UNTAET Challenges: What is to be done? http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2002/May/bulletinv3n4a.html#East%20Timor%20Faces
.
[3] In July 2003 La’o Hamutuk wrote to UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan evaluating UNMISET’s performance and
suggesting what the UN should do after UNMISET phased out in 2004. http://www.laohamutuk.org/misc/0307unmiset.html
.
[4] As early as April 2001, many Timorese
observers identified financial and structural problems in UNTAET’s
administration. La’o Hamutuk reported on budgetary issues in http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2001/Apr/bulletinv2n1.html
, highlighting how few of the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on
Timor-Leste enter the local economy or follow Timorese priorities.
[5] S/Res. 1658 (2006), Section 1.
[6] S/2005/458. In October 2005, La’o
Hamutuk wrote to SRSG Sukehiro Hasegawa outlining the most important
points relevant to “practically feasible approaches” to justice that
he, the Secretary-General and the Security Council had requested: http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/05LHtoSRSG.html.
We have published dozens of articles and reports about different facets
of the justice issue; see http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/JusticeIndex.html
for an index of those on our website.
[7] See, for example, CAVR recommendation
#7 (Justice and Truth) on page 183 of the English CAVR Executive
Summary: “the Commission concludes that the demand for justice and
accountability remains a fundamental issue in the lives of many East
Timorese people and a potential obstacle to building a democratic
society based upon respect for the rule of law and authentic
reconciliation between individuals, families, communities and nations.”
La’o Hamutuk’s analysis of the CAVR recommendations are at http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2006/Apr/bulletinv7n1.html#Editorial
.
[8] La’o Hamutuk, Can the Rule of Law
Prevail? Pressure from UNHQ Exacerbates Amos W Tax Controversy http://www.laohamutuk.org/misc/02news.html
, March 2002. After that article was published, SRSG Sergio Vieira de
Mello decided to grant New York’s wishes, and allowed the ship to
depart without paying taxes required by UNTAET tax laws he had
promulgated.
[9] La’o Hamutuk, Disorder in East Timor:
The International Community Must Accept Responsibility, December 2002, http://www.laohamutuk.org/misc/1202unrest.html
.
[10] La’o Hamutuk, An Overview of FALINTIL’S
Transformation to F-FDTL and its Implications, April 2005, http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2005/Apr/bulletinv6n1.html
.
[11] RDTL Constitution [ http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/ConstitutionEng.pdf
], Article 146.2 (Defense Force): “FALINTIL-FDTL shall guarantee
national independence, territorial integrity and the freedom and
security of the populations against any aggression or external threat,
in respect for the constitutional order.”
[12] At present, Timor-Leste has approximately $600
million in its Petroleum Fund [ http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PetFund/05PFIndex.htm
] in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Although this money is set
aside to be used sustainably with the benefit of future generations,
some suggest that more of it could be spent now to establish security
for the future and invest in human development.
Optimistically, Timor-Leste could net as much as $1,000/soldier/month
in UN reimbursements for PKF; this would be less than 2% of its current
revenues from oil and gas.
[13] La’o Hamutuk has published two reports on UN
support for Timor-Leste’s police:
An Assessment of the UN’s Police Mission in East Timor (February 2002) http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2002/Feb/bulletinv3n1.html#Police%20Mission
, and
UNMISET and Internal Security in East Timor (May 2003) http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2003/May/bulletinv4n2.html
.
[14] For a review of the UNTAET and related budgets in
2000-2001, see http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2001/Apr/bulletinv2n1.html
. The 2002-2004 UNMISET budget is depicted in http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2003/May/bulletinv4n2.html
as part of an article on UNMISET support for security.
[15] For a discussion of problems in UNMISET support
for public administration, see http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2005/Aug/bulletinv6n3.html
.
[16] See La’o Hamutuk, Panic and Reality in Dili, May
2006, http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/Panic/06LHFDTL.html
.
Charles Scheiner
La'o Hamutuk (The East Timor Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring
and Analysis)
P.O. Box 1182, White Plains, NY 10602 USA
Tel. +1-914-831-1098 or +1-914-473-3185 (mobile)
email: charlie@laohamutuk.org website: http://www.laohamutuk.org
P.O. Box 340, Dili, Timor-Leste
Telephone: +670-3325013 or +670-7234335 (mobile)
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