Transition, half way to independence

East Timor Observatory

Ref.: GOV01-06/11/2000eng

The building of the new State of Timor Lorosae by the UN transitional administration is not the building of an ideal State as imagined by international experts, created from scratch and delivered, "keys in hand" to the Timorese at the end of the transition period. Evolution from this to a more political conception, in which the Timorese participate more actively in the definition of the new State’s main features, seems to have been facilitated by the presence of two key men, one on either side – Sérgio Vieira de Mello and Xanana Gusmão. Many difficulties are still lingering, and many frustrated expectations are causing discontent among the Timorese. Criticism so far has naturally been levelled at the international officials holding the power and resources, but they could extend to the Timorese leaders who have now begun to share power with the former.    top

Background:

Security Council (SC) Resolution 1272 of 25 October 1999, instituted the UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET), conferring it "overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor" and empowering it "to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of Justice". These greatly surpass the powers normally held by a Government in a democratic regime, but are meant to respond to an exceptional situation. In addition to restoring security, reconstructing infrastructures and organising essential public services, the CS mandated UNTAET "to support capacity-building for self-government", and insisted on the "need for UNTAET to consult and cooperate closely with the East Timorese people in order to carry out its mandate effectively with a view to the development of local democratic institutions… and the transfer to these institutions of its administrative and public service functions"

Note: There is no reference here to the military forces, judicial authority and economic power – these are almost entirely in the hands of the foreigners. Timorese areas of authority, such as the media and trade unions, are still at an embryonic stage. The influence of political parties has been intentionally limited during the transition phase.    top

The facts:

1. Duration of the UN mandate

• SC Resolution 1272 of 25-10-99, establishes "UNTAET for an initial period until 31 January 2001", but gives no final date. On 29 January, Sérgio Vieira de Mello, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative and Transitional Administrator refers to two years to total independence (Reuters). Kofi Annan is less: "the UN should be guided by specific achievements rather than an arbitrary timetable", adding "We don’t want to linger, we don’t want to stay much longer than is necessary…On the other hand, I think it would be irresponsible not to do as much as we can before we leave." (AAP, 22-2-00). "The SC should be prepared to extend the mandate (…) due to expire in January 2001" (Kofi Annan, UN, New York, 29-2-2000).
• Luís André Pinto, head of the Christian Churches of East Timor (Protestant), said that it has "been agreed upon by East Timorese political leaders and religious figures to prepare independence for Timor Lorosae in two years’ time", but "UNTAET does not support the seriousness. On the contrary, there are indications the Westerners intend to stay longer in East Timor". "President Xanana Gusmão once said UNTAET officials would be in East Timor for two years and that the sooner they left East Timor, the better", added Luís Pinto (Antara, 23-3-2000).
• "Full independence can come at any time following the elections and adoption of the constitution. Elections could be held as early as April 2001, or as late as November 2001. In either case, it is unlikely that a fully functional East Timorese administration will be in place by these dates", said Peter Galbraith [director of UNTAET’s Political Affairs Section] (UNTAET, briefing 30-5-2000).   top

a) UNTAET or CNRT – which has the stronger presence?

• There are no doubts about the priorities: security, humanitarian aid, reconstruction, employment, education, health, agriculture…, nor about their urgency. What is not so clear, however, is who is to do what. The CS mandated UNTAET with overall authority, but asked it to "support capacity-building for self-government", which by definition should be the objective of a transitional structure.
• According to a UNTAET report from the Liquiça region, "CNRT have the strong support and trust of the majority of the population, and are highly coordinated and efficient in their management of programs". Another report, from Ermera, recognises that "CNRT involvement in distribution of humanitarian assistance is being extremely important due to the fact that the NGOs have been incapable of organising food distribution". In spite of these findings, both reports recommend a reinforcement of UNTAET’s capabilities, and a reduction in the CNRT’s input because "their direct involvement creates pressure from the population" (GLW, 19-1-00). [CNRT, National Council of Timorese Resistance, is an umbrella organisation for almost all the pro-independence forces].
• Most of the posts in the transitional administration are held by international staff members, many of whom are working on fixed-term 6-month contracts and will, therefore, finish their contracts before becoming adapted to the environment. Protestant Church leader, Luís Pinto, said he has come to the conclusion that UNTAET and the international NGOs have no faith in the capacity of the Timorese to prepare for independence: "There were strong indications that the process of preparing independence for the territory was being slowed down. At present, the people of East Timor could only work as drivers, security guards and interpreters, while there were a lot of other jobs that the Westerners kept for themselves" (Antara, 23-3-00). [With regard to Timorese participation in the public service, see East Timor Observatory, Employment EMP01, and EMP02 Nov 30 ETO: Employment & unemployment one year after int'l intervention].
• General acceptance of the CNRT representatives is not necessarily a sign of generalised democratic sentiment; the UN Secretary General’s report refers to acts of violence committed against a small party that is not a member of the CNRT (UN, S/2000/738 Security Council, 27.7.2000).
• Vieira de Mello created various bodies through which to consult the Timorese and involve them in decision-making. The two most important are the Public Service Commission and National Consultative Council.

• The mandate given to UNTAET attributes the Transitional Administration with functions that are usually conferred on a prime minister, plus, in the absence of parliament, it has been given judicial authority and the functions of a head of state. To moderate and share this almost absolute power, Sérgio Vieira de Mello created the NCC, composed of 15 members: 3 from UNTAET, 1 representative of the Catholic Church, 7 from the CNRT, 3 from pro-Indonesian parties (78,5% and 21.5% respectively, of the votes in last August’s referendum), plus Sérgio Vieira de Mello himself.
• "The NCC has been a unique means for UNTAET to hear and to respond to the needs of the East Timorese and for the latter to participate in important policy decisions, whose consequences will be with the people of ET well beyond UNTAET’s limited presence in the Territory. (…) UNTAET benefited greatly from the cooperation with the ET groups represented on the NCC, notably CNRT led by Mr. Gusmão (…) Maintaining the unity of purpose, they have demonstrated so far, will be a key element in ensuring a smooth transition to independence. (UN, SG S/2000/53, 26-1-2000).
• Although only a consultative body, the NCC – often equated with a mini-parliament – was meant to keep the transitional administration in touch with Timorese reality and sentiment. It became clear it could also be transformed into a simple Timorese house/chamber for legitimising decisions taken by UNTAET. On 30 December, UNTAET chiefs presented the Timorese NCC members with five draft laws for approval: they were unable to consult legislators, and had problems understanding the discussion that was conducted in English. Another example of the NCC’s limited influence on decisions taken by UNTAET (with the World Bank and IMF in the background) was the adoption of the US Dollar as the country’s official currency, when the Timorese themselves had wanted the Portuguese Escudo.
• Criticised for lack of transparency in some of its decisions, the NCC was restructured and broadened in July, and its name changed to National Council of East Timor (NCET).

• (In January the PSC was set up to supervise the functioning of the Public Administration. The PSC decides on recruitment, promotion and remuneration policy, and the rights/duties of civil servants. The TA has to consult the PSC on all issues relating to the public service. Except for appointments to the Justice department, the people appointed to high-level posts in the public administration will be selected by the TA from a shortlist of candidates drawn up by the PSC. The 7 members of the PSC are chosen by the TA: two are to be international specialists, while the others are nominated after consultation with the NCC. The PSC Chairperson is nominated by the TA. As far as possible, decisions should be unanimous. (abbrev.)) (Law/2000/3-21-2-2000).
• In spite of the PSC and UNTAET having decision-making authority on pay scales for the public administration, they were criticised by the IMF when they decided to pay higher salaries than Indonesia pays its civil servants (Dow Jones Newswires, 21-7-2000). The IMF did not take into account the inflation caused by the presence of international staff and military in ET.

• Criticism levelled at UNTAET and foreigners generally increased under the weight of the obvious differences between Timorese and foreigners and the slow pace of reconstruction. One senior UNTAET official, Prof. Chopra, resigned last March over the "handful of senior UN officials …more interested in self-advancement than helping the East Timorese rebuild their devastated country" (Sydney Morning Herald, 13-3-2000).
• The New York Times summed up the situation: "Dili today does not present a pretty picture, with a separate expatriate world superimposed on a scene of destruction and poverty. The foreigners are rich, with cars, offices, hot running water, Sunday barbecues. The East Timorese have almost nothing." "They can’t take a table out to the side of the road to sell things", said one UN official, because not only do they not have anything to sell but they don’t have a table (…)". "There is a growing impatience", said Milena Pires [who has just been elected Vice-President of the CNTL] "… so now some have begun saying: ‘OK, wait two years until the UN is finished. Then we’ll begin to rebuild.’ "New York Times, 22-4-2000).
• Sérgio Vieira de Mello admits that some criticism is well founded, but blames bureaucracy: "Regarding the mission’s mandate, words were not enough to describe the challenges faced day by day, and the UN was poorly equipped to meet some of them (…) The mission’s needs had highlighted weakness in the UN administrative practices that must be altered (…) The mission must be given the authority to use its budget as flexibly as necessary. It could only undertake the task with which it was charged if administrative procedures were adapted" (UN, Press Release SC/6882, 27-6-2000).
• In May, Sérgio Vieira de Mello offered the Timorese leadership two options for future UNTAET-Timorese relations: (a) a technocratic model, by which the administration would be fully staffed with Timorese, so a fully national civil service would be in place at independence; (b) a political model, whereby the Timorese would also share responsibility for government with UNTAET. Several portfolios in the interim government would be in the hands of the Timorese, who would enjoy political responsibility for their portfolios. This last option was "a mixed blessing", according to the TA, "as those East Timorese would also share UNTAET’s role as a punching bag". The CNRT enthusiastically welcomed the political model, which was now being implemented (UN, Press Release SC/6882, 27-6-2000).
• Peter Galbraith said, "Political leadership can benefit from a period of co-government with UNTAET in which international and East Timorese ministers serve together in a cabinet. (…)UNTAET needs to retain only the Foreign Affairs/Defence portfolio and the Justice portfolio. The precise allocation of portfolios will be a matter of consultation and negotiation. Over time, East Timorese would assume all but the functions UNTAET constitutionally must retain. Department heads (…) will become the senior civil servants under the respective ministers. In time, these department heads will be replaced by East Timorese as well. The creation of a new government structure provides an excellent opportunity to expand the role of the NCC. Both the East Timorese and international ministers should be accountable to the NCC" (UNTAET Briefing, 30-5-2000).   top

a) Mixed UNTAET-Timorese Government

• On 15 July, Sérgio Vieira de Mello announced the mixed government:

• Ramos Horta was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the interim government (RDP, 19-10-2000).

• Districts: each has the right to nominate only who is going to represent their district on the National Council. The forms are available from the Governor’s office and in the districts. Similar procedures will be followed for the civic organizations (UNTAET Briefing, 8-8-2000).
• UNTAET’s chief announced the composition of the NCET, the model intended for the future Parliament of East Timor. According to V. de Mello, the 36-seat National Council is to be all Timorese: 13 representatives of political parties (4 of which are pro-Indonesia), 13 representatives of the districts, 7 representatives of civic organizations, and 3 representatives of religious groups. 13 of the 36 representatives are women. Two seats are currently unfilled. The Independence leader Xanana Gusmão will be one of the 13 political party representatives. "The National Council reflects in a broader way East Timorese society, as well as the current political scene", said the UN mission in a communiqué released in Dili. The NCET, inaugurated on 23 October, is the result of a selection process, that included consultation of the Timorese throughout the territory, and Vieira de Mello’s efforts to make the new body more balanced, said UNTAET (20-10-00).    top

• In recent weeks, UNTAET has sought to determine the minimum criteria needed for East Timor’s independence, including the establishment of mechanisms to maintain security, a credible judicial system, and reaching a sufficient level of reconstruction that will enable the administration to function after independence (UN, Press Release SC/6882, 27-6-2000).
• "Politically, two components were needed for the transition", [said V. de Mello]. "Those were a constitutional process with democratic elections, as well as a political culture that required the political leadership to make transparent decisions for which it was willing to take responsibility. The final say about the political structure would lie with the East Timorese. He could safely predict that elections and possibly independence would take place between 30 August and December next year. A final decision would depend on progress in reaching the benchmarks. The elections would be for a Constituent Assembly" (UN, SC/6882, 27-6-2000).
• The head of the UN in East Timor said he expected talks to start in September on the type of government that the territory wants to adopt when it becomes independent, possibly at the end of next year. Sérgio Vieira de Mello said that the UN planned to carry out "a very broad consultative process", after the CNRT congress in August. "We would like the village chief, the sub-district assembly, the district council to tell us how they feel" about important issues, including whether the country wants a presidential or parliamentary system, said Vieira de Mello. After gathering these views, the idea is to set up a committee of Timorese and international constitutional that will elaborate a draft text [Constitution] "which we hope could be ready by March-April next year" (AP, UN, 29-6-2000).    top

• A former UNTAET official, Mr. Della-Giacoma, was critical of the hesitancy of those believing that it was premature to hold elections in East Timor; "After seven months of governance under UNTAET, no concrete steps have been taken by the UN to elect local officials to take part in the decision-making processes … UNTAET has appointed many East Timorese to a number of advisory bodies, including district advisory councils, and reportedly will soon appoint East Timorese "ministers". But by doing so, the UN has shown a bias toward old Lusophone elites and alienated East Timor’s youthful majority. By their very nature, appointed bodies are anti-democratic (…) Some say it would unnecessarily complicate the political landscape of East Timor, fragment the coalition of parties that is the National Council for Timorese Resistance and politicize the community. It would undoubtedly make the situation more complex for UNTAET’s overworked staff and bring new and competing voices to the fore. But there is a patronizing tone to such arguments that the East Timorese are not ready for democracy. The turnout for the August referendum, often under the threat of death, undermines that argument (The Asian Wall Street Journal, 22-6-2000).
• An electoral assessment mission from the UN’s Political Affairs Dept. arrived in Dili on 20 July. Its purpose is to gather the information necessary with which to draw up a plan of action for East Timor’s future electoral process. The mission wants to assess the capacity of local and regional actors to determine the resources available for organizing and holding democratic elections (…) Furthermore, a civic education group from the Political Affairs Dept. met with local NGOs to discuss strategies for distributing information to the public on the elections (UNTAET Briefing, 21-7-2000).
• After an initial phase, which is expected to last 6 weeks, the electoral system and corresponding education should be ready. The second phase will be devoted to the census, and the third to the logistical preparations for the elections (UNTAET Briefing, 10-10-2000).
• UNTAET’s Political Affairs Dept. wants to talk to the Timorese political parties and NGOs tomorrow, 14 October, to discuss the draft law on political party registration. The 10 parties in East Timor and 6 NGOs were invited to take part (UNTAET Briefing, 13-10-2000).   top

Xanana Gusmão accused the UN mission of failing to involve the Timorese in the process of transition to independence. "We are not interested in a legacy of cars and laws, nor are we interested in a legacy of development plans for the future designed by [people] other than East Timorese", said Xanana Gusmão in a reference to the hundreds of white UN four-wheel-drive vehicles seen around Dili and the succession of regulations being passed by the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor. "We are not interested in inheriting an economic rationale which leaves out the social and political complexity of East Timorese reality. Nor do we wish to inherit the heavy decision-making and project implementation mechanisms in which the role of the East Timorese is to give their consent as observers, rather than the active players we should start to be." (Sydney Morning Herald, 10-10-2000).    top

Note: Documents and information relating to this subject have been compiled by the East Timor Observatory in a 40-page thematic Dossier entitled "Governance – ref. GOV01". The Dossier and/or further information may be ordered from the East Timor Observatory.    top