East Timor Observatory

Subject : Political Movements and Parties: pro- autonomy

Summary:

Inside East Timor, a radical Timorese group is opposing, sometimes violently, the CNRT and Fretilin. They are calling for a return of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (RDTL), proclaimed by Fretilin in 1975. However, there are links between the RDTL’s leader and activities and Abílio Araújo who, at the time of the referendum, advocated autonomy within Indonesia for East Timor.   top
 

Background:

Overview of pro-autonomy movements & parties:

UNTAS – ‘Uni Timor Aswain’ (Aswain means Heroes), an organisation created in West Timor on 5 Feb. 2000, is the successor to the FPDK (‘Forum Persatuan, Demokrasi dan Keadilan’ – Unity, Democracy & Justice Forum), which was set up before the referendum to provide political cover for the militias. UNTAS maintains that the UN-organised referendum was fraudulent.
Its leading figures are: Domingos das Dores Soares, Basílio Dias Araújo and Filomeno de Jesus Hornay.

BRTT . ‘Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur’ (East Timorese People’s Front) was founded prior to the referendum by Francisco Lopes da Cruz (President Suharto’s former adviser on East Timor affairs) to put more emphasis on political action (being neglected by the PPI and UNTAS). Francisco Lopes da Cruz is currently Indonesia’s ambassador to Greece. On East Timor’s National Council (forerunner to an East Timorese Parliament, and composed of 36 members appointed by UNTAET) the BRTT holds one of the 5 seats reserved for pro-autonomy parties. Its representative on the Council is Salvador Ximenes Soares.

PNT – Timorese Nationalist Party was founded by Abílio Araújo, who used to be Fretilin’s overseas representative until being sacked by fellow militants over his political and financial ties with Francisco Lopes da Cruz and the Suharto clan, namely Suharto’s eldest daughter. The PNT’s representative on the National Council is Aliança Araújo, Abílio’s sister.

CPD-RDTL – Popular Defence Committee – Democratic Republic of East Timor. On 28 November 1975, just days before the invasion, Fretilin proclaimed East Timor a Democratic Republic. In 1999, young Timorese radicals founded the RDTL or CDP-RDTL group, commemorating that historic event. Its leader, Cristiano Costa, went to Portugal as a refugee in 1988, and met up there with Abílio Araújo (at the time, still Fretilin’s overseas representative), before eventually emigrating to Australia. Before the referendum, when the CNRT was calling for low-profile attitudes to prevent provocation of the militias and Indonesian military, the RDTL group channelled the anti-Indonesian radicalism of some young Timorese into actions designed to provoke. Cristiano Costa’s links with Abílio Araújo (and with General Wiranto, according to the Jakarta Post), made him the ideal candidate, along with General Zacky Anwar Makarim (Indonesian Secret Service agent sent to East Timor by Gen. Wiranto) to act as a pro-Indonesia provocateur, only on the opposing side (Jakarta Post, 16-12).

PPT – Timorese People’s Party, was established on 7 May 2000 by Hermínio da Silva da Costa (see below).

Four parties (UDT, APODETI, KOTA and Labour), which were founded in 1974, took refuge in West Timor in 1975, and adopted, either freely or under pressure, pro-integration positions, are now all pro-independence:
UDT – Timorese Democratic Union. UDT leaders who, after the invasion, went into exile, ended up fighting against Indonesian occupation and joining the CNRT.
APODETI – Timorese Popular Democratic Association was formed to defend East Timor’s link to Indonesia as an autonomous province. APODETI provided the Indonesian administration in East Timor with many senior officials. The first two Indonesia-appointed Governors of East Timor, Aranaldo Araújo and Guilherme Gonçalves, were APODETI leaders who eventually broke off relations with their “protectors”. Another disaffected leader, Frederico da Costa, now heads the APODETI-Pro-Referendum movement that has joined the CNRT. Since the formation of UNTAS, the old APODETI has ceased to function.
KOTA & the Labour Party. These two parties, which never had much popular support, re-emerged as members of the CNRT.
[The pro-independence parties will be listed in a separate document, POL02]    top
 

The Facts:

Indonesian military and civilian authorities

• After the referendum, the Dili Korem (Military Command) and its 744 and 745 battalions withdrew to the Indonesian province of NTT, and were only dissolved 7 months later, when most soldiers were transferred to other battalions stationed in the province. Ministers and generals expressed willingness to provide the Timorese militias with jobs, including within the Indonesian armed forces (NTT Ekspres-WT, 31.3.; Indonesian Observer, 26-9). Eurico Guterres resigned from the Golkar party [ Suharto, Habibie] and joined Mrs. Megawati’s PDI-P: it was the PDI-P that had given most backing to his group’s efforts to keep East Timor within Indonesia, and whose members had been most outspokenly critical of the separation following the referendum (Indonesian Observer, 24-3)
• Indonesian witnesses say that soldiers from the Indonesian strategic reserve Kostrad were training Timorese militias close to the border (South China Morning Post, 6-4.; Surya Tmor-WT, 12-4.).
• The killing of 3 UN relief workers by militias on 6 September coincided with the UN Millennium Summit. This was generally regarded as an Indonesian opposition attempt to embarrass President Wahid. The President himself agreed with this interpretation (AP, 8-9). Defence Minister, Muhammad Mahfud, and Consultative Assembly President, Amien Rais, accused the international community of engineering the murders to divert attention from its own failures in East Timor (AFP, 14-9; Detikworld, 26-9).
• “We are being challenged by the residual power of Suharto and some of his cronies who may be financing rogue elements in the militias and sectors of the army. This is a big problem”, said former Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono, who had been sacked 3 weeks earlier (The Australian, 14-9).
• Although the UN-organised referendum on independence was widely acknowledged as being fair, Defence Minister Mahfud insisted on maintaining it was riddled with cases of fraud (Detikworld, 23-9).
• Army chief General Endriartono Sutarto said in an interview; “…our soldiers have had links [with militias] for a very long time because they used to work together to keep East Timor as part of Indonesia. After the referendum (…) we all have to convince the militias that their [political] struggle should no longer rely on the use of force or weapons (…) If they really want East Timor to go back to Indonesia, they could be East Timorese citizens now and form a party, a political party and, after winning the elections, they could ask the people if they want to rejoin Indonesia or not (…). If they continue [with disorder] we will be obliged to take measures against them. Possession of firearms in Indonesia requires a licence…” (Channel NewsAsia, Singapore, 12-10).
• After the arrest of Eurico Guterres in Jakarta on “illegal possession and carrying of firearms” charges, the Consultative Assembly [Senate] and Legislative Assembly [Parliament] presidents, Amien Rais and Akbar Tanjung respectively, publicly expressed support for the militia chief accused by the UN of crimes against humanity “He’s our friend, he’s the leader of the pro-integration militias…If he’s arrested at the request of the UN, then what a nasty country that makes us”, said Amien Rais (South China Morning Post, 7-10).

PPI

• On 12 December 1999, Xanana Gusmão met with the leading militias commander on the border. “João Tavares then announced his willingness to disband his militia in West Timor” (UN SG S/2000/53, 26-1-00). In April, however, he stated that he wanted to fight to the death: “to die in East Timor and be wrapped in the [Indonesian] red and white flag” (NTT Ekspres, 6-4).
• Infiltrations in East Timor by heavily armed militias are frequent; an Aitarak militiaman, captured by the international forces, said his mission was to kill a UN official (Público, 8-3.). In August, UNTAET estimated that 150 to 200 heavily armed and well-trained militias, divided into groups, had entered East Timor (AP, 15-8). At a seminar held in the Hotel Cendana, Kupang, on 14 October, Cancio Lopes de Carvalho told participants that he had already sent many of his men into East Timor to conduct guerrilla activities (West Timorese NGO Forum, Information for the Security Council delegation, 15-11).
• Some militia leaders, however, began to realise that there were other alternatives: Joanico Cesário Belo, commander of the Team Saka militia [previously located in Baucau], went to Dili in a private capacity and was received by UNTAET (Kyodo, 10-3); Hermínio da Silva da Costa, third in command in the militia hierarchy, formed a political party (7-5), breaking his ties with UNTAS [and PPI] because they had rejected his appeals to recognise the referendum and cooperate with UNTAET (Kyodo, 15-6.) in order to take part in future elections. 200 relatives of militias return to East Timor (AFP, 3-9.). A further 65 Timorese, who had served as auxiliaries (milsas) in the Indonesian army, return to Timor with their families (410). The process, agreed by UNTAET and the TNI (Indonesian armed forces) took several months to become operational because salaries and pensions had not been paid (AFP, 20-11).
• The UN levels accusations at some of the more militant militia leaders: Laurentino Soares (Moko), leader of the Sakunar militia, was accused of continuing to commit murder in the Oecussi enclave, East Timorese district located within West Timor. After much pressure, Moko was arrested in February, accused of “illegal possession and sale of firearms” and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Eurico Guterres was also arrested, accused of “possession and carrying firearms”, but the judge dismissed the charges on the grounds that they were “vague” and that it was not clear whether the accused was, “like hundreds of other militias, a civilian or member of the Indonesian armed forces” (AP, 26-7).
• On the first anniversary of the referendum (30-8), thousands of ex-militias destroyed cars and beat up journalists in Kupang. Led by Eurico Guterres, they marched on the Governor’s office and Legislative Assembly, where they smashed windows and burned a picture of former President Habibie, who had allowed East Timor to become independent (Antara, quoted by AFP, 3-8).
• On 5 September, Olívio Mendonça (Moruk), leader of the Lakasaur militia, was killed in unclear circumstances. He had been accused, with some Indonesian officers, of taking part in the Suai massacre in which 3 priests and about 100 people, who had taken refuge in the local church, were murdered. The Attorney General, Marzuki Darusman, suspected that Moruk’s killing was politically motivated: “I think it was too coincidental that Olivio was killed right after he was named a suspect” (Sydney Morning Herald, 8-9).
• On 6 September, militias killed 3 UNHCR workers in Atambua: militias had surrounded and attacked the organisation’s centre, while Indonesian police and military present at the scene did nothing to stop them. The UNHCR had recorded at least 103 security incidents against aid workers and refugees by early September.
• As international pressure increased, a weapons surrendering ceremony was organised, and attended by Mrs. Megawati and UN observers since, according to the Security Minister, Yudhoyono: “The greatest threat to Indonesia now is an embargo”. Eurico Guterres and his men surrendered some weapons, but when their plans to meet Mrs. Megawati were thwarted, Guterres ordered his men to seize back their weapons (Indonesian Observer, 25-9).
• Eurico Guterres was arrested in Jakarta [not in West Timor] (AFP, 4-10).
• Militias’ reactions varied: some say they are ready to return to East Timor: “to continue the struggle” (Francisco Amaral da Silva); “carrying the Indonesian flag” (Francisco Soares)”; “with the Indonesian flag and drag Carrascalão and friends before an international court” (Miguel Soares Babo, pro-integration fighter since 1975).
• Others seemed disorientated. During a visit from Foreign Affairs Minister Alvi Shihab and Defence Minister Muhammad Mahfud, Joanico Cesário Belo said that 200 of his men had been given training by the Indonesian army in Aileu and in Sijantung, Special Forces headquarters. Over 1,500 men had received automatic and semi-automatic firearms from the military. Addressing reporters, Joanico Belo said that 13 militia battalion commanders had agreed to write a letter revealing the Indonesian military’s support for the militias: “we were treated like honey in East Timor, but like poison here in Indonesia”, he said, complaining about the arrest of Eurico Guterres (Kyodo Newswires, 8-10). Nemencio Lopes de Carvalho expressed his disappointment at being persecuted after having “risked body and soul for Indonesia’s victory” (Kompas, 16-10). His brother, Câncio Lopes de Carvalho, claimed he was terrified by “ninjas” he presumed belonged to security forces (Tempo, 17-10). The two brothers were commanders of the Mahidi militia based in Ainaro – one of the most violent groups. The three militia leaders already mentioned, plus Domingos Pereira, wrote to the UN asking for protection and saying they were prepared to reveal the role played by the Indonesian military; they claimed to have held secret meetings in Dili in August 99 with Wiranto, Damiri and Habibie, and to have received orders to kill all independence supporters if they were victorious in the referendum. They asked that their “brother” Eurico Guterres be tried by an international court, but Guterres, under arrest, rejected this plea, about which he had not been consulted (AFP, 17-10).
• Abílio Osório Soares, former Governor of East Timor, believed the call for an international court was, to an extent, justified and said he was prepared to appear before such a court as it would be fairer than the national judicial system. “If my testimony were revealed here, who would listen? I don’t think the Government would want to hear my voice. I’m just a refugee now” (Jakarta Post, 18-10). He is one of the suspects called by the Indonesian court to answer to charges of crimes against humanity. Abílio Araújo is critical of the UN and US, accusing them of bias towards the pro-independence side.
• UNTAET asked for Guterres to be extradited to stand trial in East Timor (UNTAET, 11.10). The Supreme Courts called for the reopening of Eurico Guterres’ case (Tempo, 12-10 quoted by the BBC, 14-10). UNTAET is only allowed to question him in Indonesia (Jakarta Post, 13-10). The Jakarta court ordered his release on grounds that there had been no warrant for his arrest, but the police refuse to release him (AFP, 23 and 24-10).
• On 6 January 2001, the trial of 6 militias accused of killing the 3 UN aid workers began. Although one confessed to the crime, there were suspicions that the defendants were not the actual murderers, but were merely being used to take the blame, said militia leader Nemencio de Carvalho (Radar Timor, 3-11). This hypothesis is one that should be considered, said the West Timorese NGO Forum (Information for the Security Council delegation, 15-11).
• In February this year, UNTAET reported it had received a letter in which Mr. Lopes de Carvalho [Câncio, on behalf of his two brothers) stating that he wished to return and live in East Timor and that he accepted the result of the August 1999 popular consultation. He also said he accepted that East Timor would be an independent country and was willing to face justice and help in the country’s reconstruction efforts.

UNTAS

• In December 1999, the FPDK, political umbrella organisation for the militias, announced that the militias had been deactivated. It changed its name to the National Unity Front, changing it once again in late January-early February 2000, during its congress in West Timor, to UNTAS – Uni Timor Aswain. Indonesian President A. Wahid and several Ministers were invited to the congress, but only West Timor’s Governor, Piet Tallo, and a Foreign Affairs Ministry representative actually attended (Gatra, 5-2).
• In his January report, the UN Secretary General said talks were underway for a seat on the National Consultative Council (NCC) to be filled by the FPDK. At its congress, UNTAS decided to continue to reject the referendum and any collaboration with the Transitional Government, but the talks continued. The pro-autonomy groups wanted the representation on the NCC as the CNRT, which led S. Vieira de Melo to express disappointment (UNTAET, 9-2.). Representation of these groups had been fixed at 3 members, while the CNRT was to have 7 (they had obtained, respectively, 21,5% and 78,5% of the votes in the referendum). The NCC was set up in December 1999 by UNTAET to assist the Transitional Government. It consists of 4 foreigners and 11 Timorese (the 11th Timorese being a representative of the Catholic Church).
• The decision taken at the UNTAS congress was not unanimous. UNTAS president, Domingos das Dores Soares, wrote to Sergio Vieira de Melo saying that UNTAS wanted talks with the UN, but it had still not decided whether to take up the two [!] seats reserved for it on the NCC. As a result of this indecision, Salvador Ximenes Sores [former editor of the newspaper Suara Timor Timur] was not representing UNTAS on the NCC (Lusa, 29-3.).
• In his letter, the UNTAS president also said that the organisation was exclusively political and that the militias no longer existed. Two other leaders, Basílio Dias and Domingos Soares, stated at a press conference that the militias had been disbanded on 19 December 1999, and that they did not know who was had been conducting incursions into East Timor (AFP, 11-3). According to another leader, Apolio da Silva, formerly the Ainaro District police chief, there had been no training since the militias’ coordinating body had been dissolved on 16 December: “before that, training had been frequent” (Surya Timor, 13-4).
• Filomeno de Jesus Hornay, secretary-general of UNTAS, criticised the militia leaders who had appealed for UN protection: “they should get their things and leave Indonesian soil”. With regards returning to East Timor, he was in favour of the partition idea that had been proposed by some pro-autonomy Timorese before the referendum. He said he would go back “if we were forced”, but warns that “it could be like a bomb …” and that it was preferable “ to have a clear division between pro-independence and pro-Indonesia groups” (South China Morning Post, 17-8.).
• The former president of the Oecussi enclave’s Legislative Council under Indonesian occupation, João Corbafo, a member of the UNTAS Consultative Council, but “not a high-ranking leader” according to another leader (Surya Timor, 4-1.), said he could go back with 50,000 of the enclave’s inhabitants who were currently refugees in West Timor (Japan Economic Newswires, 24-11). The UNHCR reported, however, that of the 50,000 enclave residents at the time of the referendum, only 9,000 to 10,000 were still refugees in NTT (UNHCR, JOC update 15, 5.12). Corbafo then announced that he could bring back 20,000 to 30,000, including mixed families (UNHCR, JOC update 16, 12-12), then finally put the number at 10,000 (AFP, 20-12).

PPT

• Hermínio da Silva e Costa formed the PPT: “We don’t know the timetable for the elections yet, but we are making preparations to be one of the parties contesting those elections”. He was, therefore, registering the party with UNTAET and discussing security conditions so that refugees could exercise their right to vote, he said. The PPT’s symbols were to be red and white [colours of the Indonesian flag] (Antara, 10-5).
• The party is outlawed in West Timor: “I have informed PPT leader Hermínio da Silva da Costa not to hold political meetings in NTT”, said NTT Deputy Governor Johanis Pake Pani (Jawa Pos, 25-5.).
• On 31 May, Hermínio received a letter from S. Vieira de Mello recognising the party. In June he visited East Timor, announcing that he supported reconciliation as long as there would be no retribution: “reconciliation means no punishment, and punishment means no reconciliation” he said. He said he would give Xanana Gusmão his backing as future President, and that possibly 90% of the refugees would return (Kyodo, 15-6.).
• In September Hermínio announced that he was ready to go back; he accused UNTAET of not taking more initiative, and criticised “those who are afraid to return who call him a ‘traitor’ ” (Diário de Notícias, 4-9).

PNT and CPD-RDTL

Although a supporter of autonomy, Abílio Araújo has “called on all East Timorese to push for general elections in two or three years… to lay a strong foundation for its future as a sovereign State” (Jakarta Post, 25-1). He maintained the new State would have strong ties with Indonesia, especially with regards language and currency, and has criticised Xanana Gusmão´s choice of Portuguese as official language. Abílio Araújo said he could “never forget how non-indigenous people like Ramos Horta and Xanana Gusmão always boast about their Portuguese blood” (Jakarta Post, 25-3). The PNT leader, who still lives in Portugal, has been critical of the UN: “UNTAET policy so far has only focused on the interests of the Western conspiracy, particularly Portugal and Australia, through the CNRT” (Antara, 20-4, BBC, 21-4).
In East Timor itself, the CPD-RDTL has been organising violent attacks against the same targets: “CNRT is a puppet … imposed by Lisbon…” said Cristiano Costa (AP, 1-4).    top
 

Conclusions:

1. The Indonesian Government often claims that it has disarmed the militias and that it wants normal relations with independent East Timor, but its actions and statements, as outlined above, show that these intentions are either not felt by all concerned or simply not genuine.
2. Very few Timorese leaders who fought – and committed crimes – to defend integration/autonomy in Indonesia are showing signs of accepting the fact that a clear desire for independence was expressed through the 1999 referendum, or that they are prepared to face justice. This is true even among those who say they want to go back. The Lopes de Carvalho brothers, however, seem prepared to accept these two conditions, but want to negotiate. Hermínio da Silva da Costa accepts the referendum but is still keen to fight, by political means, to overturn its results, and refuses to be brought to justice. João Corbafo has so far not publicly said anything on the matter.
3. The priority given to securing the return of the refugees – and the pro-autonomy leaders who promise to take refugees back with them – has led the UN and leaders like Xanana Gusmão to underestimate the risks involved in transplanting to East Timor pockets of opposition that reject independence and that could get support (now or in the future) from Indonesia.
4. The proposal that East Timor should set up a South Africa-style truth and reconciliation commission should be evaluated in terms of the East Timorese context. Even without reconciliation, the forces of apartheid are now very restricted in South Africa by the demographic context. In contrast, however, the geographic and socio-political context of Timor and Indonesia could work in favour of those who do no want reconciliation.
5. Timorese society has its own traditional methods of resolving conflicts, which include material compensation paid by the offender to the victim. Employing such traditional methods might make the idea of reconciliation more understandable and, consequently, make it more meaningful for those concerned.     top

See Also:

BD: Pro-autonomy Movements / Pró autonomia Movimentos - A collection of recent information, reports, articles and news

Portuguese:
Feb 12 OTL: Movimentos e partidos Pró autonomia: evolução desde o referendo  Report
"O Governo indonésio proclama frequentemente que desarmou as milícias e que quer manter relações normais com Timor Leste independente; os actos e declarações acima reportados mostram que este sentimento está ainda longe de ser geral ou autêntico. ... A sociedade timorense tem formas tradicionais de resolução de conflitos, que incluem compensações materiais pagas pelo ofensor ao ofendido. Recorrer a essas formas tradicionais pode dar à noção de reconciliação um sentido mais perceptível e portanto mais autêntico para as duas partes." OTL

Apr 24 ACFOA: Briefing Notes on political parties and groupings  Report
"East Timor is now entering the last, crucial stage of the transition process to full independence. National elections for a Constituent Assembly to develop a Constitution for the new nation will be held on 30 August 2001. Over the months that follow, decision-making and power will be transferred from the United Nations Transitional Administration (UNTAET) to democratically elected East Timorese legislative and executive bodies. ...
Until now, the CNRT independence umbrella body has occupied centre stage.  This has had the effect of obscuring the parties who, like the FALINTIL guerillas in the run-up to the August 99 ballot, have endured a period of necessary political cantonment in the interests of national unity. The scene is now set, however, for the political parties to take their rightful place under the spotlight as key players in the democratic process. This is a healthy and positive development which excesses by some should not be permitted to undermine.
In November 1999, ACFOA published a backgrounder on CNRT called ‘From Opposition to Proposition: the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) in Transition’, to contribute to a more informed and positive reception for CNRT by the international community. It is hoped these notes will play a similar role in relation to the parties by answering the questions observers and others will have about these new players. How many parties will contest the election? Who are their leaders and how does one contact them? How have they changed from previous times? What ideas and policies do they have for East Timor’s development, foreign policy and so on?"  Pat Walsh, Australian Council for Overseas Aid

Mar 5 ETO: Political parties and Pro-Independence Forces  Report
"There are 8 parties behind the independence flag. Of the five parties set up in 1974, four eventually collaborated, to a greater or lesser extent, with the Indonesian occupiers. FRETILIN always maintained its opposition to the occupation. Aware of its present advantage, FRETILIN now feels restricted as part of the united front proposed by Xanana Gusmão, and wants to leave it to conquer its own territory. For some, however, talk of such a move only rekindles memories of the 1974 civil war and impels Xanana Gusmão to appeal for national unity." East Timor Observatory

Portuguese:
Mar 5 OTL: Partidos políticos e Forças pró-independência  Report
"Oito partidos apresentam-se sob a bandeira da independência. Dos cinco partidos criados em 1974, quatro foram levados a colaborar, mais ou menos, com o ocupante indonésio. A FRETILIN sempre se opôs à ocupação. Consciente da vantagem que adquiriu, a FRETILIN sente-se limitada na frente comum proposta por Xanana Gusmão, e quer partir à conquista do poder. Mas para alguns isso faz renascer a lembrança da guerra civil de 1974 e provoca apelos angustiados de Xanana Gusmão a favor da unidade nacional."  Observatório Timor Leste

BD: National Council of Timorese Resistance / Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense (CNRT) - A collection of recent speeches, statements, news and reports

BD: FRETILIN - Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor / Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independente - A collection of recent speeches, documents, statements, news and reports