BACK DOOR Newsletter on East
"The Indonesian Government often claims that it has disarmed
the militias and that it wants normal relations with independent East Timor,
but its actions and statements, as outlined [below], show that these intentions
are either not felt by all concerned or simply not genuine. ... Timorese
society has its own traditional methods of resolving conflicts, which include
material compensation paid by the offender to the victim. Employing such
traditional methods might make the idea of reconciliation more understandable
and, consequently, make it more meaningful for those concerned." ETO
Pro-autonomy Movements / Pró autonomia Movimentos - A collection
of recent information, reports, articles and news
12 OTL: Movimentos e partidos Pró autonomia: evolução
desde o referendo Report
Subject : Political Movements and Parties: pro- autonomy
Overview of pro-autonomy movements & parties
How have the pro-autonomy movements evolved since the August 1999 referendum,
in which 78,5% of the electors voted in favour of independence? The two
main groups, the militias and their political wing (UNTAS), both operating
from within Indonesia, oppose the presence of relief organisations so they
can maintain control over the refugees, without whom they would lose their
power. They send armed men into East Timor to incite a guerrilla struggle,
and still receive political and military support in Indonesia. Only one
high-ranking militia leader has accepted the reality of the referendum;
he announced the formation of a political party in order to run in the
elections, under the colours of the Indonesian flag. His fellow pro-Indonesia
militants, however, call him a traitor as they refuse to accept the referendum
results. International pressure is beginning to have an effect: two
militia leaders have been arrested and others, fearing the same fate, are
threatening to reveal all about the Indonesian armed forces that supplied
them with weapons and incited them to kill.
Inside East Timor, a radical Timorese group is opposing, sometimes violently,
the CNRT and Fretilin.
They are calling for a return of the Democratic Republic of East Timor
(RDTL), proclaimed by Fretilin in 1975. However, there are links between
the RDTL’s leader and activities and Abílio Araújo who, at
the time of the referendum, advocated autonomy within Indonesia for East
In spite of the Indonesian Government’s official acceptance of the August
1999 referendum results, and the successive modifications in the State
apparatus – the election of President Abdurrahman Wahid being the most
prominent - support given to the militias by politicians and military has
diminished slowly and only then because of international pressure. Pressure
from the international community has also had a negative effect: it has
provoked a nationalist backlash that has been exacerbated by politicians
who are waiting for President Wahid’s fall from power. An important factor
of change now seems to lie in the rejection of the refugees by West Timor’s
Indonesian population, themselves victims of militia violence. The future
of the refugees depends on the balance or, more accurately, the imbalance
between the Timorese and Indonesian forces who want to keep them in West
Timor because their presence there generates economic and/or political
gains, and those who are eager for them to return to East Timor, even if
their motive is just to get rid of them and the problems they represent.
Overview of pro-autonomy movements & parties:
PPI – ‘Pejuang Pro-Integrasi’ or ‘Pasukan Pejuang Integrasi’
(Pro-Integration Fighters) is the military umbrella organisation for
all the militia groups. The same structure also goes by the acronym MPO
– ‘Milisia Pro-Otonomy’.
Its principle leaders are João da Silva Tavares and Eurico Guterres.
The organisation’s third in command, Hermínio da Silva da Costa,
resigned in May to form a political party – the PPT.
(For information on militias and leaders before the referendum, see
UNTAS – ‘Uni Timor Aswain’ (Aswain means Heroes), an organisation
created in West Timor on 5 Feb. 2000, is the successor to the FPDK (‘Forum
Persatuan, Demokrasi dan Keadilan’ – Unity, Democracy & Justice Forum),
which was set up before the referendum to provide political cover for the
militias. UNTAS maintains that the UN-organised referendum was fraudulent.
Its leading figures are: Domingos das Dores Soares, Basílio
Dias Araújo and Filomeno de Jesus Hornay.
BRTT . ‘Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur’ (East Timorese People’s
Front) was founded prior to the referendum by Francisco Lopes da Cruz
(President Suharto’s former adviser on East Timor affairs) to put more
emphasis on political action (being neglected by the PPI and UNTAS). Francisco
Lopes da Cruz is currently Indonesia’s ambassador to Greece. On East Timor’s
National Council (forerunner to an East Timorese Parliament, and composed
of 36 members appointed by UNTAET) the BRTT holds one of the 5 seats reserved
for pro-autonomy parties. Its representative on the Council is Salvador
PNT – Timorese Nationalist Party was founded by Abílio
Araújo, who used to be Fretilin’s overseas representative until
being sacked by fellow militants over his political and financial ties
with Francisco Lopes da Cruz and the Suharto clan, namely Suharto’s eldest
daughter. The PNT’s representative on the National Council is Aliança
Araújo, Abílio’s sister.
CPD-RDTL – Popular Defence Committee – Democratic Republic
of East Timor. On 28 November 1975, just days before the invasion,
Fretilin proclaimed East Timor a Democratic Republic. In 1999, young Timorese
radicals founded the RDTL or CDP-RDTL group, commemorating that historic
event. Its leader, Cristiano Costa, went to Portugal as a refugee in 1988,
and met up there with Abílio Araújo (at the time, still Fretilin’s
overseas representative), before eventually emigrating to Australia. Before
the referendum, when the CNRT was calling for low-profile attitudes to
prevent provocation of the militias and Indonesian military, the RDTL group
channelled the anti-Indonesian radicalism of some young Timorese into actions
designed to provoke. Cristiano Costa’s links with Abílio Araújo
(and with General Wiranto, according to the Jakarta Post), made him the
ideal candidate, along with General Zacky Anwar Makarim (Indonesian Secret
Service agent sent to East Timor by Gen. Wiranto) to act as a pro-Indonesia
provocateur, only on the opposing side (Jakarta Post, 16-12).
PPT – Timorese People’s Party, was established on 7 May
2000 by Hermínio da Silva da Costa (see below).
Four parties (UDT, APODETI, KOTA and Labour), which were founded in
1974, took refuge in West Timor in 1975, and adopted, either freely or
under pressure, pro-integration positions, are now all pro-independence:
UDT – Timorese Democratic Union. UDT leaders who, after
the invasion, went into exile, ended up fighting against Indonesian occupation
and joining the CNRT.
APODETI – Timorese Popular Democratic Association was
formed to defend East Timor’s link to Indonesia as an autonomous province.
APODETI provided the Indonesian administration in East Timor with many
senior officials. The first two Indonesia-appointed Governors of East Timor,
Aranaldo Araújo and Guilherme Gonçalves, were APODETI leaders
who eventually broke off relations with their “protectors”. Another disaffected
leader, Frederico da Costa, now heads the APODETI-Pro-Referendum movement
that has joined the CNRT. Since the formation of UNTAS, the old APODETI
has ceased to function.
KOTA & the Labour Party. These two parties, which
never had much popular support, re-emerged as members of the CNRT.
[The pro-independence parties will be listed in a separate document,
The following summarised reports of actions and statements by the Indonesian
authorities have been selected to help place the Timorese pro-autonomy
groups in context.
Indonesian military and civilian authorities
After the referendum, the Dili Korem (Military Command) and its 744 and
745 battalions withdrew to the Indonesian province of NTT, and were only
dissolved 7 months later, when most soldiers were transferred to other
battalions stationed in the province. Ministers and generals expressed
willingness to provide the Timorese militias with jobs, including within
the Indonesian armed forces (NTT Ekspres-WT, 31.3.; Indonesian Observer,
26-9). Eurico Guterres resigned from the Golkar party [ Suharto, Habibie]
and joined Mrs. Megawati’s PDI-P: it was the PDI-P that had given most
backing to his group’s efforts to keep East Timor within Indonesia, and
whose members had been most outspokenly critical of the separation following
the referendum (Indonesian Observer, 24-3)
Indonesian witnesses say that soldiers from the Indonesian strategic reserve
Kostrad were training Timorese militias close to the border (South China
Morning Post, 6-4.; Surya Tmor-WT, 12-4.).
The killing of 3 UN relief workers by militias on 6 September coincided
with the UN Millennium Summit. This was generally regarded as an Indonesian
opposition attempt to embarrass President Wahid. The President himself
agreed with this interpretation (AP, 8-9). Defence Minister, Muhammad Mahfud,
and Consultative Assembly President, Amien Rais, accused the international
community of engineering the murders to divert attention from its own failures
in East Timor (AFP, 14-9; Detikworld, 26-9).
“We are being challenged by the residual power of Suharto and some of
his cronies who may be financing rogue elements in the militias and sectors
of the army. This is a big problem”, said former Defence Minister Juwono
Sudarsono, who had been sacked 3 weeks earlier (The Australian, 14-9).
Although the UN-organised referendum on independence was widely acknowledged
as being fair, Defence Minister Mahfud insisted on maintaining it was riddled
with cases of fraud (Detikworld, 23-9).
Army chief General Endriartono Sutarto said in an interview; “…our soldiers
have had links [with militias] for a very long time because they used to
work together to keep East Timor as part of Indonesia. After the referendum
(…) we all have to convince the militias that their [political] struggle
should no longer rely on the use of force or weapons (…) If they really
want East Timor to go back to Indonesia, they could be East Timorese citizens
now and form a party, a political party and, after winning the elections,
they could ask the people if they want to rejoin Indonesia or not (…).
If they continue [with disorder] we will be obliged to take measures against
them. Possession of firearms in Indonesia requires a licence…” (Channel
NewsAsia, Singapore, 12-10).
After the arrest of Eurico Guterres in Jakarta on “illegal possession and
carrying of firearms” charges, the Consultative Assembly [Senate] and Legislative
Assembly [Parliament] presidents, Amien Rais and Akbar Tanjung respectively,
publicly expressed support for the militia chief accused by the UN of crimes
against humanity “He’s our friend, he’s the leader of the pro-integration
militias…If he’s arrested at the request of the UN, then what a nasty country
that makes us”, said Amien Rais (South China Morning Post, 7-10).
On 12 December 1999, Xanana Gusmão met with the leading militias
commander on the border. “João Tavares then announced his willingness
to disband his militia in West Timor” (UN SG S/2000/53, 26-1-00). In
April, however, he stated that he wanted to fight to the death: “to
die in East Timor and be wrapped in the [Indonesian] red and white flag”
(NTT Ekspres, 6-4).
Infiltrations in East Timor by heavily armed militias are frequent; an
Aitarak militiaman, captured by the international forces, said his mission
was to kill a UN official (Público, 8-3.). In August, UNTAET estimated
that 150 to 200 heavily armed and well-trained militias, divided into groups,
had entered East Timor (AP, 15-8). At a seminar held in the Hotel Cendana,
Kupang, on 14 October, Cancio Lopes de Carvalho told participants that
he had already sent many of his men into East Timor to conduct guerrilla
activities (West Timorese NGO Forum, Information for the Security Council
Some militia leaders, however, began to realise that there were other alternatives:
Joanico Cesário Belo, commander of the Team Saka militia [previously
located in Baucau], went to Dili in a private capacity and was received
by UNTAET (Kyodo, 10-3); Hermínio da Silva da Costa, third in command
in the militia hierarchy, formed a political party (7-5), breaking his
ties with UNTAS [and PPI] because they had rejected his appeals to recognise
the referendum and cooperate with UNTAET (Kyodo, 15-6.) in order to take
part in future elections. 200 relatives of militias return to East Timor
(AFP, 3-9.). A further 65 Timorese, who had served as auxiliaries (milsas)
in the Indonesian army, return to Timor with their families (410). The
process, agreed by UNTAET and the TNI (Indonesian armed forces) took several
months to become operational because salaries and pensions had not been
paid (AFP, 20-11).
The UN levels accusations at some of the more militant militia leaders:
Laurentino Soares (Moko), leader of the Sakunar militia, was accused of
continuing to commit murder in the Oecussi enclave, East Timorese district
located within West Timor. After much pressure, Moko was arrested in February,
accused of “illegal possession and sale of firearms” and sentenced
to 18 months imprisonment. Eurico Guterres was also arrested, accused of
and carrying firearms”, but the judge dismissed the charges on the
grounds that they were “vague” and that it was not clear whether
the accused was, “like hundreds of other militias, a civilian or member
of the Indonesian armed forces” (AP, 26-7).
On the first anniversary of the referendum (30-8), thousands of ex-militias
destroyed cars and beat up journalists in Kupang. Led by Eurico Guterres,
they marched on the Governor’s office and Legislative Assembly, where they
smashed windows and burned a picture of former President Habibie, who had
allowed East Timor to become independent (Antara, quoted by AFP, 3-8).
On 5 September, Olívio Mendonça (Moruk), leader of the Lakasaur
militia, was killed in unclear circumstances. He had been accused, with
some Indonesian officers, of taking part in the Suai massacre in which
3 priests and about 100 people, who had taken refuge in the local church,
were murdered. The Attorney General, Marzuki Darusman, suspected that Moruk’s
killing was politically motivated: “I think it was too coincidental
that Olivio was killed right after he was named a suspect” (Sydney
Morning Herald, 8-9).
On 6 September, militias killed 3 UNHCR workers in Atambua: militias had
surrounded and attacked the organisation’s centre, while Indonesian police
and military present at the scene did nothing to stop them. The UNHCR had
recorded at least 103 security incidents against aid workers and refugees
by early September.
As international pressure increased, a weapons surrendering ceremony was
organised, and attended by Mrs. Megawati and UN observers since, according
to the Security Minister, Yudhoyono: “The greatest threat to Indonesia
now is an embargo”. Eurico Guterres and his men surrendered some weapons,
but when their plans to meet Mrs. Megawati were thwarted, Guterres ordered
his men to seize back their weapons (Indonesian Observer, 25-9).
Eurico Guterres was arrested in Jakarta [not in West Timor] (AFP, 4-10).
Militias’ reactions varied: some say they are ready to return to East Timor:
continue the struggle” (Francisco Amaral da Silva); “carrying the
Indonesian flag” (Francisco Soares)”; “with the Indonesian flag
and drag Carrascalão and friends before an international court”
(Miguel Soares Babo, pro-integration fighter since 1975).
Others seemed disorientated. During a visit from Foreign Affairs Minister
Alvi Shihab and Defence Minister Muhammad Mahfud, Joanico Cesário
Belo said that 200 of his men had been given training by the Indonesian
army in Aileu and in Sijantung, Special Forces headquarters. Over 1,500
men had received automatic and semi-automatic firearms from the military.
Addressing reporters, Joanico Belo said that 13 militia battalion commanders
had agreed to write a letter revealing the Indonesian military’s support
for the militias: “we were treated like honey in East Timor, but like
poison here in Indonesia”, he said, complaining about the arrest of
Eurico Guterres (Kyodo Newswires, 8-10). Nemencio Lopes de Carvalho expressed
his disappointment at being persecuted after having “risked body and
soul for Indonesia’s victory” (Kompas, 16-10). His brother, Câncio
Lopes de Carvalho, claimed he was terrified by “ninjas” he presumed belonged
to security forces (Tempo, 17-10). The two brothers were commanders of
the Mahidi militia based in Ainaro – one of the most violent groups. The
three militia leaders already mentioned, plus Domingos Pereira, wrote to
the UN asking for protection and saying they were prepared to reveal the
role played by the Indonesian military; they claimed to have held secret
meetings in Dili in August 99 with Wiranto, Damiri and Habibie, and to
have received orders to kill all independence supporters if they were victorious
in the referendum. They asked that their “brother” Eurico Guterres be tried
by an international court, but Guterres, under arrest, rejected this plea,
about which he had not been consulted (AFP, 17-10).
Abílio Osório Soares, former Governor of East Timor, believed
the call for an international court was, to an extent, justified and said
he was prepared to appear before such a court as it would be fairer than
the national judicial system. “If my testimony were revealed here, who
would listen? I don’t think the Government would want to hear my voice.
I’m just a refugee now” (Jakarta Post, 18-10). He is one of the suspects
called by the Indonesian court to answer to charges of crimes against humanity.
Abílio Araújo is critical of the UN and US, accusing them
of bias towards the pro-independence side.
UNTAET asked for Guterres to be extradited to stand trial in East Timor
(UNTAET, 11.10). The Supreme Courts called for the reopening of Eurico
Guterres’ case (Tempo, 12-10 quoted by the BBC, 14-10). UNTAET is only
allowed to question him in Indonesia (Jakarta Post, 13-10). The Jakarta
court ordered his release on grounds that there had been no warrant for
his arrest, but the police refuse to release him (AFP, 23 and 24-10).
On 6 January 2001, the trial of 6 militias accused of killing the 3 UN
aid workers began. Although one confessed to the crime, there were suspicions
that the defendants were not the actual murderers, but were merely being
used to take the blame, said militia leader Nemencio de Carvalho (Radar
Timor, 3-11). This hypothesis is one that should be considered, said the
West Timorese NGO Forum (Information for the Security Council delegation,
In February this year, UNTAET reported it had received a letter in which
Mr. Lopes de Carvalho [Câncio, on behalf of his two brothers) stating
that he wished to return and live in East Timor and that he accepted the
result of the August 1999 popular consultation. He also said he accepted
that East Timor would be an independent country and was willing to face
justice and help in the country’s reconstruction efforts.
In December 1999, the FPDK, political umbrella organisation for the militias,
announced that the militias had been deactivated. It changed its name to
the National Unity Front, changing it once again in late January-early
February 2000, during its congress in West Timor, to UNTAS – Uni Timor
Aswain. Indonesian President A. Wahid and several Ministers were invited
to the congress, but only West Timor’s Governor, Piet Tallo, and a Foreign
Affairs Ministry representative actually attended (Gatra, 5-2).
In his January report, the UN Secretary General said talks were underway
for a seat on the National Consultative Council (NCC) to be filled by the
FPDK. At its congress, UNTAS decided to continue to reject the referendum
and any collaboration with the Transitional Government, but the talks continued.
The pro-autonomy groups wanted the representation on the NCC as the CNRT,
which led S. Vieira de Melo to express disappointment (UNTAET, 9-2.). Representation
of these groups had been fixed at 3 members, while the CNRT was to have
7 (they had obtained, respectively, 21,5% and 78,5% of the votes in the
referendum). The NCC was set up in December 1999 by UNTAET to assist the
Transitional Government. It consists of 4 foreigners and 11 Timorese (the
11th Timorese being a representative of the Catholic Church).
The decision taken at the UNTAS congress was not unanimous. UNTAS president,
Domingos das Dores Soares, wrote to Sergio Vieira de Melo saying that UNTAS
wanted talks with the UN, but it had still not decided whether to take
up the two [!] seats reserved for it on the NCC. As a result of this indecision,
Salvador Ximenes Sores [former editor of the newspaper Suara Timor Timur]
was not representing UNTAS on the NCC (Lusa, 29-3.).
In his letter, the UNTAS president also said that the organisation was
exclusively political and that the militias no longer existed. Two other
leaders, Basílio Dias and Domingos Soares, stated at a press conference
that the militias had been disbanded on 19 December 1999, and that they
did not know who was had been conducting incursions into East Timor (AFP,
11-3). According to another leader, Apolio da Silva, formerly the Ainaro
District police chief, there had been no training since the militias’ coordinating
body had been dissolved on 16 December: “before that, training had been
frequent” (Surya Timor, 13-4).
Filomeno de Jesus Hornay, secretary-general of UNTAS, criticised the militia
leaders who had appealed for UN protection: “they should get their things
and leave Indonesian soil”. With regards returning to East Timor, he
was in favour of the partition idea that had been proposed by some pro-autonomy
Timorese before the referendum. He said he would go back “if we were
forced”, but warns that “it could be like a bomb …” and that
it was preferable “ to have a clear division between pro-independence
and pro-Indonesia groups” (South China Morning Post, 17-8.).
The former president of the Oecussi enclave’s Legislative Council under
Indonesian occupation, João Corbafo, a member of the UNTAS Consultative
Council, but “not a high-ranking leader” according to another leader
(Surya Timor, 4-1.), said he could go back with 50,000 of the enclave’s
inhabitants who were currently refugees in West Timor (Japan Economic Newswires,
24-11). The UNHCR reported, however, that of the 50,000 enclave residents
at the time of the referendum, only 9,000 to 10,000 were still refugees
in NTT (UNHCR, JOC update 15, 5.12). Corbafo then announced that he could
bring back 20,000 to 30,000, including mixed families (UNHCR, JOC update
16, 12-12), then finally put the number at 10,000 (AFP, 20-12).
Hermínio da Silva e Costa formed the PPT: “We don’t know the
timetable for the elections yet, but we are making preparations to be one
of the parties contesting those elections”. He was, therefore, registering
the party with UNTAET and discussing security conditions so that refugees
could exercise their right to vote, he said. The PPT’s symbols were to
be red and white [colours of the Indonesian flag] (Antara, 10-5).
The party is outlawed in West Timor: “I have informed PPT leader Hermínio
da Silva da Costa not to hold political meetings in NTT”, said NTT
Deputy Governor Johanis Pake Pani (Jawa Pos, 25-5.).
On 31 May, Hermínio received a letter from S. Vieira de Mello recognising
the party. In June he visited East Timor, announcing that he supported
reconciliation as long as there would be no retribution: “reconciliation
means no punishment, and punishment means no reconciliation” he said.
He said he would give Xanana Gusmão his backing as future President,
and that possibly 90% of the refugees would return (Kyodo, 15-6.).
In September Hermínio announced that he was ready to go back; he
accused UNTAET of not taking more initiative, and criticised “those
who are afraid to return who call him a ‘traitor’ ” (Diário
de Notícias, 4-9).
PNT and CPD-RDTL
Although a supporter of autonomy, Abílio Araújo has “called
on all East Timorese to push for general elections in two or three years…
to lay a strong foundation for its future as a sovereign State” (Jakarta
Post, 25-1). He maintained the new State would have strong ties with Indonesia,
especially with regards language and currency, and has criticised Xanana
Gusmão´s choice of Portuguese as official language. Abílio
Araújo said he could “never forget how non-indigenous people
like Ramos Horta and Xanana Gusmão always boast about their Portuguese
blood” (Jakarta Post, 25-3). The PNT leader, who still lives in Portugal,
has been critical of the UN: “UNTAET policy so far has only focused
on the interests of the Western conspiracy, particularly Portugal and Australia,
through the CNRT” (Antara, 20-4, BBC, 21-4).
In East Timor itself, the CPD-RDTL has been organising violent attacks
against the same targets: “CNRT is a puppet … imposed by Lisbon…”
said Cristiano Costa (AP, 1-4). top
The Indonesian Government often claims that it has disarmed the militias
and that it wants normal relations with independent East Timor, but its
actions and statements, as outlined above, show that these intentions are
either not felt by all concerned or simply not genuine.
Very few Timorese leaders who fought – and committed crimes – to defend
integration/autonomy in Indonesia are showing signs of accepting the fact
that a clear desire for independence was expressed through the 1999 referendum,
or that they are prepared to face justice. This is true even among those
who say they want to go back. The Lopes de Carvalho brothers, however,
seem prepared to accept these two conditions, but want to negotiate. Hermínio
da Silva da Costa accepts the referendum but is still keen to fight, by
political means, to overturn its results, and refuses to be brought to
justice. João Corbafo has so far not publicly said anything on the
The priority given to securing the return of the refugees – and the pro-autonomy
leaders who promise to take refugees back with them – has led the UN and
leaders like Xanana Gusmão to underestimate the risks involved in
transplanting to East Timor pockets of opposition that reject independence
and that could get support (now or in the future) from Indonesia.
The proposal that East Timor should set up a South Africa-style truth and
reconciliation commission should be evaluated in terms of the East Timorese
context. Even without reconciliation, the forces of apartheid are now very
restricted in South Africa by the demographic context. In contrast, however,
the geographic and socio-political context of Timor and Indonesia could
work in favour of those who do no want reconciliation.
Timorese society has its own traditional methods of resolving conflicts,
which include material compensation paid by the offender to the victim.
Employing such traditional methods might make the idea of reconciliation
more understandable and, consequently, make it more meaningful for those
Observatory for the monitoring of East Timor's
transition process a programme by the 'Comissão para os Direitos
do Povo Maubere'
Coordinator: Cláudia Santos
Rua Pinheiro Chagas, 77 2ºE - 1069-069
Lisboa - Portugal
ph.: 351 1 317 28 60 - fax: 351 1 317 28 70 -
ETO was set up by two Portuguese NGOs - the Commission for the Rights
of the Maubere People (CDPM) and the ecumenical group Peace is Possible
in East Timor, which have been involved in East Timor solidarity
work since the early eighties. The aim of the Observatory was to monitor
East Timor's transition process, as well as the negotiating process and
its repercussions at international level, and the developments in the situation
inside the territory itself.
Pro-autonomy Movements / Pró autonomia Movimentos - A collection
of recent information, reports, articles and news
12 OTL: Movimentos e partidos Pró autonomia: evolução
desde o referendo Report
"O Governo indonésio proclama frequentemente
que desarmou as milícias e que quer manter relações
normais com Timor Leste independente; os actos e declarações
acima reportados mostram que este sentimento está ainda longe de
ser geral ou autêntico. ... A sociedade timorense tem formas tradicionais
de resolução de conflitos, que incluem compensações
materiais pagas pelo ofensor ao ofendido. Recorrer a essas formas tradicionais
pode dar à noção de reconciliação um
sentido mais perceptível e portanto mais autêntico para as
duas partes." OTL
24 ACFOA: Briefing Notes on political parties and groupings
"East Timor is now entering the last,
crucial stage of the transition process to full independence. National
elections for a Constituent Assembly to develop a Constitution for the
new nation will be held on 30 August 2001. Over the months that follow,
decision-making and power will be transferred from the United Nations Transitional
Administration (UNTAET) to democratically elected East Timorese legislative
and executive bodies. ...
Until now, the CNRT
independence umbrella body has occupied centre stage. This has
had the effect of obscuring the parties who, like the FALINTIL guerillas
in the run-up to the August 99 ballot, have endured a period of necessary
political cantonment in the interests of national unity. The scene is now
set, however, for the political parties to take their rightful place under
the spotlight as key players in the democratic process. This is a healthy
and positive development which excesses by some should not be permitted
In November 1999, ACFOA published a backgrounder
on CNRT called ‘From Opposition to Proposition: the
National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) in Transition’, to contribute
to a more informed and positive reception for CNRT by the international
community. It is hoped these notes will play a similar role in relation
to the parties by answering the questions observers and others will have
about these new players. How many parties will contest the election? Who
are their leaders and how does one contact them? How have they changed
from previous times? What ideas and policies do they have for East Timor’s
development, foreign policy and so on?" Pat Walsh, Australian
Council for Overseas Aid
5 ETO: Political parties and Pro-Independence Forces Report
"There are 8 parties behind the independence
flag. Of the five parties set up in 1974, four eventually collaborated,
to a greater or lesser extent, with the Indonesian occupiers. FRETILIN
always maintained its opposition to the occupation. Aware of its present
advantage, FRETILIN now feels restricted as part of the united front proposed
by Xanana Gusmão, and wants to leave it to conquer its own territory.
For some, however, talk of such a move only rekindles memories of the 1974
civil war and impels Xanana Gusmão to appeal for national unity."
5 OTL: Partidos políticos e Forças pró-independência
"Oito partidos apresentam-se sob a bandeira
da independência. Dos cinco partidos criados em 1974, quatro foram
levados a colaborar, mais ou menos, com o ocupante indonésio. A
FRETILIN sempre se opôs à ocupação. Consciente
da vantagem que adquiriu, a FRETILIN sente-se limitada na frente comum
proposta por Xanana Gusmão, e quer partir à conquista do
poder. Mas para alguns isso faz renascer a lembrança da guerra civil
de 1974 e provoca apelos angustiados de Xanana Gusmão a favor da
unidade nacional." Observatório
National Council of Timorese Resistance / Conselho Nacional de Resistência
Timorense (CNRT) - A collection of recent speeches, statements, news and
FRETILIN - Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor / Frente Revolucionaria
do Timor Leste Independente - A collection of recent speeches, documents,
statements, news and reports
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